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ABSTRACT—The United States has included some form of income tax on 
corporations at least since the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment one 
hundred years ago. Notwithstanding this long lineage, however, 
surprisingly little is known about who ultimately ends up bearing the cost 
of the tax, or whether it even matters. Perhaps in simpler economic times 
such as 1913, or 1932, or even 1980, this might have been acceptable. But 
as the world confronts vastly different economic conditions than the ones 
faced in the past, finding new ways to understand and implement the 
corporate tax for the next one hundred years will become crucial to its 
survival. This Article will introduce one such way, by taking into account 
how macroeconomic conditions, such as high unemployment, impact who 
bears the cost of the corporate income tax. This insight can fundamentally 
alter the landscape of the existing corporate tax policy debate, from 
whether to use corporate taxes to increase the progressivity of the income 
tax, to lowering the corporate tax rate to stimulate the economy, to 
abolishing the corporate tax altogether. By explicitly incorporating both 
macro- and microeconomic considerations into fiscal policy, policymakers 
can transform the corporate income tax from a blunt and uncertain fiscal 
tool into a precise instrument robust enough to survive the next one 
hundred years. 
This Article will consider one specific example—proposing a 
dynamic, self-adjusting corporate tax rate, or DST for short. The DST takes 
into account the fact that specific macroeconomic conditions, such as high 
unemployment, can create incentives for employers to shift the cost of the 
corporate tax onto labor through lower wages, increased layoffs, or 
otherwise. The DST offsets this by charging employers (through higher 
marginal tax rates) when they do shift the cost of the corporate tax onto 
labor while, at the same time, rewarding employers (through lower 
marginal tax rates) when they make instead new investments in labor. In 
this manner, the DST could help reduce existing tax-induced distortions to 
behavior and address high unemployment at the same time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has included some form of income tax on 
corporations at least since the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment one 
hundred years ago.1 Notwithstanding its long lineage, however, little is 
known about how the corporate income tax actually works or who ends up 
paying for it. Until recently, this inability to comprehend precisely who 
bears the cost of the corporate income tax has been accepted as a sort of 
necessary evil. Perhaps in simpler economic times, such as 1913, 1932, or 
even 1980,2 tax policy could tolerate this lack of understanding without 
causing any undue harm. But in this anniversary year of the modern income 
tax, with a large, complex, and multinational economy characterized by 
very low interest rates, persistently high unemployment, highly mobile 
 
1 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 
889, 915–17 (2006). Forms of a corporate income tax were in place prior to the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment and the enactment of the modern income tax in 1913 as well. See 1 BORIS I. 
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE WITH THE COLLABORATION OF GERSHAM GOLDSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 1.01 (Thomson Reuters/WG&L 7th ed. 2013) 
(1959). 
2 See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Op-Ed., Reaganism After Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at A17 
(“They slavishly adhere to the economic program that Reagan developed to meet the challenges of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, ignoring the fact that he largely overcame those challenges, and now we 
have new ones.”). 
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multinational corporations, sophisticated financial markets, and near-zero 
inflation, it is time to rethink what a corporate tax can and should look like 
for the next one hundred years. 
A debate has emerged over using tax policy, and particularly corporate 
tax policy, to address the ills of the modern economy. One side argues that 
taxes must be cut to stimulate investment and economic growth, while the 
other argues that tax cuts would be nothing more than a giveaway to the 
rich.3 Both sides see the issue as all-or-nothing. In this respect, at least, both 
sides are wrong. There is no reason the debate need be limited simply to 
raising or lowering the tax rate, pitting growth against employment. Rather, 
modern conceptions of macroeconomic theory can be incorporated into the 
analysis to create a new fiscal policy—one that is uniquely suited for the 
challenges of the new economy and fosters both economic growth and 
employment. 
The key to doing so in the corporate income tax context is to focus on 
what economists call the “incidence” of the tax (or, put more simply, who 
ultimately pays the cost of the tax). Essentially, when a corporation pays a 
tax, at least one of the following groups must lose: shareholders in the form 
of lower profits, workers in the form of lower wages, or consumers in the 
form of higher prices.4 Most economists traditionally believed that 
shareholders bore the cost of the corporate tax in the form of lower profits.5 
Recently, however, economists have begun to question this conclusion, 
finding that, in the modern economy, workers often bear a significant 
portion of the tax in the form of lower wages, lower employment, or both.6 
This Article, relying on these developments in the theoretical and empirical 
economics literature, will work under the assumption that, under the unique 
conditions of the modern economy, increasing amounts of the corporate 
income tax are often borne by labor rather than capital.7 
 
3 See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 18, 2012, at A12. 
4 In other words, “[t]he most basic lesson about corporate taxes is this: A corporation is not really a 
taxpayer at all. It is more like a tax collector. The ultimate payers of the corporate tax are those 
individuals who have some stake in the company on which the tax is levied. . . . The corporate tax leads 
to lower returns on capital, lower wages or higher prices . . . .” N. Gregory Mankiw, The Problem with 
the Corporate Tax, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/business/01
view.html?_r=0. 
5 See Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 
(1962). 
6 See generally Bruce Bartlett, Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG 
(Feb. 19, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/who-pays-the-corporate-
income-tax (summarizing four articles on corporate tax incidence published in the March 2013 issue of 
the National Tax Journal); see also infra notes 22–30 and accompanying text. 
7 Although only corporate shareholders own stock in entities that pay the corporate income tax, all 
capital over time effectively bears whatever share of the corporate income tax is borne by shareholders 
through operations of the market. See JULIE-ANNE CRONIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 
OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: REVISED U.S. TREASURY 
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Such a conclusion could radically alter the landscape of the modern 
corporate tax debate. Almost all proposals to reform the corporate income 
tax, from those supporting a raise in the corporate income tax (to increase 
progressivity of the tax system) to those supporting the elimination of the 
corporate income tax altogether, make some assumption about who is in 
fact bearing the incidence of the tax. Regardless of one’s goals, knowing 
more about the incidence of the corporate income tax and the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on incidence will increase one’s ability to meet 
these goals through the design and structure of the corporate income tax. 
To this end, why not envision a corporate tax that is both pro-growth 
and pro-employment at the same time, while proving self-financing in the 
long run? This need not be the stuff of science fiction. Building a pro-
growth, pro-employment, self-financing corporate income tax may be 
possible, but it will require fundamentally rethinking how the corporate tax 
actually works and what it should be intended to accomplish. To do so will 
require deconstructing a number of well-established and generally accepted 
propositions about the operation of the corporate income tax and 
recombining them, for the first time, to take into account the unique 
conditions of the modern economy. 
This Article will provide one example of how to do so, by proposing 
the repeal of the current fixed corporate income tax rate and replacing it 
with a new dynamic, self-adjusting tax, or DST for short. To counteract an 
employer’s incentive to shift incidence onto labor due to macroeconomic 
conditions, the DST ties the corporate tax rate directly to the employment 
decisions of corporate employers—as employment goes up, taxes go down, 
and vice versa. 
The DST could offer a number of benefits. The first, and primary, 
benefit would be a traditional microeconomic one. Assuming labor bears an 
inefficiently high percentage of the corporate tax during periods of high 
unemployment as compared to periods of more typical levels of 
unemployment, shifting the burden back to capital should result in 
efficiency gains. The DST accomplishes this by charging employers for 
attempting to shift the incidence of the tax onto labor during periods of 
high unemployment. 
Unlike traditional efficiency-driven tax policy proposals, however, the 
DST could also have a positive macroeconomic feedback effect in addition 
to its microeconomic benefits. If labor bears an increasing share of the 
incidence of the corporate tax during periods of high unemployment, 
 
METHODOLOGY 2 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/
OTA-T2012-05-Distributing-the-Corporate-Income-Tax-Methodology-May-2012.pdf (“As capital 
flows take place, the corporate tax burden is shifted to non-corporate capital over time through 
reductions in the return to non-corporate capital until after tax returns in both sectors are the same. As 
such, the tax burden initially falls on current owners of corporate capital and then on future investors of 
corporate and non-corporate capital.”). 
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cutting corporate taxes should result in more jobs, higher wages, or both. 
But rather than merely hoping this occurs,8 the DST conditions the 
corporate tax cut on actually increasing payroll, rather than hoarding cash 
or paying the savings out as a dividend. Consequently, at least some of the 
cash savings from the tax cut would go to the benefit of labor, in the form 
of higher wages or reduced layoffs, while the remainder would be available 
to the corporation to be invested in productive assets. 
But that is not the end of the story, since any corporate tax cut would 
also need to be paid for.9 As an initial matter, the combination of economic 
growth and increased employment resulting from the DST has the ability to 
increase revenue itself, at least to some extent. But the DST also has its 
own automatic, built-in revenue feature10: raising tax rates on firms that 
reduce payroll. This has two benefits. First, to avoid this tax increase, 
corporations would have an incentive to look elsewhere, other than 
reducing labor costs, to cut costs in the face of a recession. Second, the 
government would raise revenue as wages decreased or unemployment 
increased, or both, since the companies that did reduce payroll would incur 
higher tax rates. By both creating incentives to reduce layoffs or wage cuts 
and increasing revenue, the proposal could essentially pay for itself over 
the long run, at least based on relatively conservative assumptions. 
Tying together the business cycle, the corporate income tax, and the 
firm’s employment decisions in this manner could permit the corporate tax 
to embody both pro-growth and pro-employment fiscal policies at the same 
time. Rather than merely raising or lowering total taxes in response to 
recessions, the proposal would serve to offset the implicit shift of the 
incidence of the corporate tax away from capital and onto labor during 
periods of high unemployment, while at the same time substantially cutting 
taxes for corporations that increase employment. In this manner, the tax 
law would—for the first time—be unified toward pro-growth and pro-
employment policies, while remaining largely self-financing over the long-
term. 
Combining economic theory and legal theory in this manner can 
provide the means to overcome the seemingly intractable, and definitely 
unhelpful, political and policy stalemate facing the country. By rejecting 
the binary of demand-side versus supply-side economic theory—
exemplified in the “tax cuts for the rich” versus “fairness for the middle 
 
8 See Mankiw, supra note 4; cf. NILS AUS DEM MOORE & TANJA KASTEN, DO WAGES RISE WHEN 
CORPORATE TAX RATES FALL? DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSES OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS 
TAX REFORM 2000 (2009), http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/MooreKasten2009.pdf (empirically 
analyzing whether wages rise when corporate tax rates fall). 
9 One proposal has been to increase the gasoline tax to offset a corporate tax rate cut. See Mankiw, 
supra note 4 (“[A] gas-tax increase of about 40 cents a gallon could fund a corporate rate cut, fostering 
economic growth and reducing a variety of driving-related problems.”). 
10 See id. (“Some economists think that these effects are strong enough to make a corporate rate cut 
self-financing.”). 
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class” debate—both sides could rightfully claim victory for their preferred 
tax policy. Of course, no tax law can prevent or mitigate pure demagoguery 
or hyperbolic hysteria over tax policy, but this new approach has the 
potential to challenge, weaken, or even topple, the existing policy 
rationales underlying the intransigence of the modern debate. 
Part I of this Article will summarize and discuss the literature on 
corporate tax incidence and explain how under conditions of high 
unemployment, low inflation, and near-zero interest rates, the corporate tax 
can be borne significantly by workers. Part II.A will then introduce 
macroeconomic theory into the analysis, discussing how current 
macroeconomic conditions significantly change the way to think about the 
corporate tax itself. In response, Part II.B introduces the pro-growth, pro-
employment, self-financing DST mechanism as a solution to the current 
problem. Part II.C will go on to explain how, taking the incidence analysis 
as a given, the DST can better achieve the fiscal policy goals of the tax 
system. Part III will then discuss some theoretical and administrative 
difficulties in implementing the proposal. Lastly, Part IV will review some 
of the political and rhetorical hurdles facing the use of tax law as fiscal 
policy, and discuss how the analytic approach of this Article, if not the 
DST itself, can help overcome these hurdles. 
I. THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND 
MACROECONOMICS: HISTORY AND LESSONS 
Notwithstanding over one hundred years of experience, surprisingly 
little is known about how the corporate income tax actually works or who 
ends up paying it. The question of who ultimately bears the cost of the 
corporate income tax is generally referred to as the problem of the 
“incidence” of the corporate income tax.11 The root cause behind the 
incidence problem is pretty straightforward: corporations are not human 
beings. Rather, corporations are creatures of law, allocations of power and 
responsibility among people to permit the efficient pooling of capital by 
separating ownership of capital from the management of it.12 
Then what does it mean for a corporation to “pay” taxes? It simply 
means that the corporation transfers wealth to the government instead of to 
one of its constituencies—shareholders, employees, suppliers, or 
consumers.13 Since income taxes are paid out of profits, and shareholders 
are generally entitled to the profits of a corporation, it would appear at first 
that the incidence of the tax must be borne by the shareholders. However, 
this may not necessarily be correct, as there are other constituencies that 
 
11 See Harberger, supra note 5, at 215. 
12 This is true regardless which theory of corporate personhood is applied. See, e.g., David Millon, 
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 183 (2004); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
13 See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 58–59 (2009). 
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could effectively bear the incidence of the corporate tax as well.14 For 
example, a corporation could raise the price of its goods or services to 
account for the income tax thereby ensuring after-tax profits remain the 
same. In such a case, consumers would effectively bear the incidence of the 
corporate income tax through higher prices.15 Alternatively, a corporation 
could lower employee salaries to maintain the same after-tax profits, in 
which case labor would bear the incidence of the corporate tax. So which 
group really bears the brunt of the incidence—capital, labor, or 
consumers?16 The well-established answer in the literature is . . . nobody 
knows.17 Or, more precisely, that nobody can ever really know.18 Rather, 
the answer to “who bears the cost of the corporate income tax?” depends on 
one’s theory about how corporations and the economy interact, and which 
constituencies have no other choice but to bear the incidence. The next 
section summarizes some of these theories. 
A. A Brief Background on Incidence Theory 
Harberger first comprehensively analyzed the incidence of the 
corporate tax over fifty years ago.19 Harberger assumed two industries—a 
taxed one and an untaxed one—and the presence of efficient markets. 
Under these assumptions, the incidence of the tax on the taxed sector 
depended on the relative inputs into each industry. In other words, in labor-
intensive industries labor would bear more of the tax and in capital-
intensive industries capital would bear more of the tax. Crucially, however, 
Harberger assumed full employment in this model, a standard assumption.20 
This was important because it meant that labor would leave the taxed 
industry and move to the untaxed industry as the tax cost increased. Since 
there could be no involuntary unemployment, under basic supply and 
demand theory the increased supply of labor in the untaxed industry would 
result in lower labor costs, which would also then attract capital, until a 
 
14 See id. at 63. 
15 Although this is possible for a particular consumer, consumers as a whole are generally not 
considered to bear the incidence of the corporate tax since it would “wash” out over multiple 
corporations. See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 63; Harberger, supra note 5, at 217–20. 
16 This analysis assumes end-product producers only. There is another possibility, however, that 
intermediate suppliers would bear the corporate income tax through lower prices. Assuming some fixed 
costs of production and competition, however, there is a limit to the ability to do so. See, e.g., Kul B. 
Bhatia, Intermediate Goods and the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 16 J. PUB. ECON. 93 
(1981). 
17 See William A. Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer’s View of a 
Problem in Economics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 576, 601 (“[T]he only proper answer to the question ‘Is the 
corporation income tax shifted?’ must be, ‘Maybe so, maybe not—I just don’t know.’”). 
18 See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, in 20 TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (James M. Poterba ed., 2006); Bartlett, supra note 6. 
19 See Harberger, supra note 5. 
20 Id. at 216. 
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new equilibrium was reached. Under the Harberger model, under most 
standard assumptions, capital would generally bear most—if not all—of the 
incidence of the corporate tax. 
Subsequent work introduced the impact of other factors.21 For 
example, Atkinson and Stiglitz introduced the impact of unemployment; in 
other words, they relaxed the standard assumption used by Harberger that 
the price of labor would always adjust such that there would never be 
unemployment in the market.22 This proved rather difficult as there was 
(and is) no single accepted theory for the presence of unemployment in an 
economy. Importantly, the basis for assuming why there is unemployment 
in the market impacts how it affects the incidence analysis.23 Atkinson and 
Stiglitz introduced an assumption of nonmarket-clearing unemployment by 
tying wages to sticky prices; in other words they assumed that for some 
reason the price of labor could not change immediately in the face of 
unemployment. This could occur, for example, if there were minimum 
wage laws, union contracts, or other limits on the ability to reduce wages. 
As a result, in contrast to what Harberger assumed, wages would not drop 
in the face of excess supply of labor, and there would no longer be full 
employment in the model. 
Under that set of assumptions, unsurprisingly, the incidence analysis 
changed significantly from Harberger’s analysis. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
found three effects: (1) a direct effect on labor depending on the relative 
elasticity of substitution between the taxed and untaxed sector, (2) an 
indirect “demand” effect where the impact on labor depended on the impact 
on prices and the labor intensity of the taxed sector, and (3) an effect on 
labor depending on the relative elasticity of the price of labor in the 
market.24 The conclusion they drew was that “[w]here the individual is 
unable to sell all the labour he wishes, an expansion of employment 
contributes ceteris paribus to an increase in welfare.”25 Intuitively this 
makes sense; if something in the economy creates involuntary 
unemployment, there will be more workers looking for work than there will 
be jobs. In such a case, workers should be willing to work for less, meaning 
 
21 See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
222–26 (1980); Jennifer C. Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General Equilibrium 
Estimates and Analysis (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2010-03, 2010), https://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11519/05-2010-working_paper-corp_tax_incidence-
review_of_gen_eq_estimates.pdf. 
22 See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 222. 
23 See, e.g., Leon Bettendorf et al., Corporate Tax Policy and Unemployment in Europe: An 
Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, 32 WORLD ECON. 1319, 1319 (2009) (“There is only little 
research, however, on the labour market implications of corporate taxation, and virtually no papers on 
corporate taxes and unemployment. . . . Previous studies that have analysed the relationship between 
corporate taxes and employment have typically assumed a perfect labour market.”). 
24 See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 225. 
25 Id. 
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employers can more easily shift the incidence of the corporate tax onto 
workers than in a world absent unemployment. 
Importantly, regardless of the methodology used, recent work using a 
number of different theories of involuntary unemployment have found 
labor bearing a significantly higher share of the incidence of the corporate 
tax than under the Harberger model. For example, Miyagiwa26 looked at the 
effects of sectoral unemployment, in which certain sectors of the economy 
cannot lower wages while others can (for example, when there is a 
unionized and nonunionized sector of the economy).27 Agell and Lundborg 
looked at involuntary unemployment as a result of fair wages, meaning 
employees care not only about total wages, but also about the ratio of 
wages to returns on capital.28 Parai and Choudhary analyzed incidence 
where labor was not perfectly mobile.29 Rapanos considered the question 
under the impact of efficiency wages, comparing not only the dollar cost of 
wages but also the impact of those wages on the effort of labor.30 
Regardless of the theory, all of the above studies concluded that labor bears 
more of the incidence of the corporate income tax in the presence of 
unemployment than under the Harberger model. 
What emerges from this line of literature is a distinct lack of consensus 
on how macroeconomic conditions impact the incidence analysis,31 since 
 
26 Kaz Miyagiwa, Corporate Income Tax Incidence in the Presence of Sector-Specific 
Unemployment, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 103 (1988). 
27 Others have looked at similar questions as well. See, e.g., Leonard F.S. Wang, Sector-Specific 
Unemployment and Corporate Income Tax Incidence: A Geometric Exposition, 37 AM. ECONOMIST 64 
(1993). 
28 Jonas Agell & Per Lundborg, Fair Wages, Involuntary Unemployment and Tax Policies in the 
Simple General Equilibrium Model, 47 J. PUB. ECON. 299 (1992). 
29 Amar K. Parai & Munir A.S. Choudhary, Imperfect Labor Mobility and Corporate Tax 
Incidence, 6 INT’L ECON. J. 75 (1992). If labor were not perfectly mobile, workers who lost jobs in one 
city would not be able to take jobs in another, leading to some unemployment. 
30 Vassilis T. Rapanos, Tax Incidence in a Model with Efficiency Wages and Unemployment, 
20 INT’L ECON. J. 477 (2006). Efficiency wage theory would explain involuntary unemployment by 
attributing two motivating factors to the labor wage rate: (1) supply and demand for labor and (2) the 
effect of the wage rate on the effort of employees. Id. at 479. Thus, it could be rational for an employer 
to pay a higher wage than absolutely necessary if that higher wage resulted in higher effort by workers, 
making the per-dollar return on labor higher. If this occurs, the labor wage rate is set above the market-
clearing rate, resulting in involuntary unemployment. Assuming this is true, higher levels of 
unemployment would serve to reduce the pure labor wage rate, meaning employers could extract even 
greater effort out of labor at the existing efficiency wage rate. 
31 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Who Ultimately Pays the Corporate Income Tax?, N.Y. TIMES 
ECONOMIX BLOG (July 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/who-
ultimately-pays-the-corporate-income-tax/?_r=0 (“General-equilibrium models accommodating this 
wider view of the economy and the longer run go much beyond the compass of a freshman course and 
show that who actually pays the corporate income tax—the owners of capital or labor—is driven by a 
number of factors in complicated ways that elude simple intuition.”); see also Peter Mieszkowski, Tax 
Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution of Income, 7 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1103, 
1116–17 (1969) (criticizing previous studies for omitting significant changes in unemployment over 
their sample time periods). 
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one’s results depend on how one explains the presence of macroeconomic 
conditions, such as high unemployment, in the first place.32 But what does 
emerge is that almost any theory of unemployment, whether it be efficiency 
wages, lack of labor mobility, unions, or otherwise, leads to labor bearing a 
larger portion of the incidence of the corporate income tax than under the 
Harberger model. Thus, if one takes as a given the presence of high, 
persistent unemployment, low inflation, and near-zero interest rates, such 
as in the current economy, it is possible to state that the relative elasticity of 
labor during periods of high unemployment is lower than the relative 
elasticity of labor during periods of full employment. Under Atkinson–
Stiglitz, one effect of this change in relative elasticity of labor would be an 
increase of the incidence of the tax on labor. Under other approaches, such 
as Agell and Lundborg or Paraia and Choudharya or Rapanos, this would 
almost certainly be the effect. 
In other words, at some point members of the labor force could 
become locked into their jobs, meaning labor becomes near inelastic. At 
such a point, it would be anticipated that capital could much more easily 
demand increased effort, lower wages, or both, even during times of record 
profits.33 The same could be thought of in terms of the incidence of the 
tax.34 
One theory of the incidence of the corporate income tax that adopts a 
similar approach is sometimes referred to as the “wage bargaining” 
model.35 Under the wage bargaining model, employers take into account 
the cost of the tax and then attempt to allocate it among the relative 
constituencies. As would be expected, who bears the incidence of the tax 
depends on the relative elasticities of the constituencies. If labor has high 
bargaining power, capital will bear more of the incidence.36 If consumers 
highly demand the product, the corporation can raise prices and consumers 
will bear more of the incidence. 
 
32 See, e.g., CRONIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–6 (discussing assumptions in previous incidence 
studies). For example, neoclassical economics assumes that involuntary unemployment cannot exist, 
Keynesian economics takes it as a given, while New Classical and New Keynesian try to rationalize 
these positions. See, e.g., Paul Wojick & Mark Pernecky, The Impossibility of Involuntary 
Unemployment in New Keynesian Efficiency Wage Models, 20 E. ECON. J. 291 (1994). 
33 There is some indication that this may be the case. See Neil Irwin, Who Will Get the Spoils of an 
Improving Economy: Shareholders or Workers?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 9, 2013, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/09/who-will-get-the-spoils-of-an-
improving-economy-shareholders-or-workers. 
34 See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 59–60 (describing the elasticity theory of tax incidence). 
35 For a recent example, see Wiji Arulampalam et al., The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income 
Tax on Wages (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 5293, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1704266. 
36 See R. Alison Felix & James R. Hines, Jr., Corporate Taxes and Union Wages in the United 
States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15263, 2009), available at http://www.nb
er.org/papers/w15263. 
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Interestingly, although not the dominant theory under the Harberger 
line of incidence literature, this wage bargaining model of tax incidence has 
begun to attract significant empirical support. For example, one recent 
empirical study found that labor could bear up to 75% of the incidence of 
the corporate tax,37 while another study found that labor could bear up to 
60% of the tax in the face of imperfect competition and capital mobility,38 
and a working paper from the Congressional Budget Office estimated the 
amount to be upwards of 70%.39 Crucially, all of these studies focus on the 
relative elasticity of labor as compared to capital. To the extent a high 
inelasticity of labor supply is assumed, for example due to unusually high 
and persistent unemployment, a corollary assumption would be that labor 
would bear a disproportionate amount of the incidence of the corporate tax, 
at least as compared to the situation of full employment.40 
B. Conceptualizing Incidence in the Modern Economy: An Example 
To illustrate, imagine a company—assume it is called General 
Automotive (GA)—which manufactures and sells cars. In a typical year 
GA makes 1000 cars, which sell for $20,000 each, generating $20 million 
in gross revenue per year. The raw materials for the cars cost $10 million, 
which remains relatively fixed year to year, and GA employs 100 workers 
who earn $50,000 per year, for a total labor cost of $5 million. Taken 
together, in a typical year GA earns a profit of $5 million. Then, out of the 
blue, the economy goes into a deep recession, and people stop buying as 
many cars. GA’s sales drop from 1000 cars per year to 800 cars per year, 
total revenue drops from $20 million to $16 million, and profits drop from 
$5 million to $1 million. 
 
37 Arulampalam et al., supra note 35, at 5 (citing Mihir A. Desai et al., Labor and Capital Shares of 
the Corporate Tax Burden: International Evidence (Dec. 2007) (presented at the International Tax 
Policy Forum and Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center 2007 conference), available at http://www.aea
web.org/aea/2011conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=326). But see Kimberly A. Clausing, In 
Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. 433 (2012) (criticizing some of these studies). 
38 See Li Liu & Rosanne Altshuler, Measuring the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax Under 
Imperfect Competition 3 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 11/05, 2011), 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/
Series_11/WP1105.pdf. 
39 See William C. Randolph, International Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax 44 (Cong. Budget 
Office, Working Paper No. 2006-09, 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/75
xx/doc7503/2006-09.pdf; see also Robert Carroll, Corporate Taxes and Wages: Evidence from the 50 
States 3 (Tax Found., Working Paper No. 8, 2009), http://www.taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.
org/files/docs/wp8.pdf (“[F]or every one dollar increase in state and local corporate tax revenues, wages 
can be expected to fall by roughly 2.5 dollars.”). 
40 See, e.g., JIM NUNNS, URBAN INST. & URBAN–BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TPC 
DISTRIBUTES THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX (2012), http://taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412651-
Tax-Model-Corporate-Tax-Incidence.pdf. For a good overview of empirical evidence on labor’s share 
of corporate tax incidence, see Matthew H. Jensen & Aparna Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on Labor: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 131 TAX NOTES 1083 (2011). 
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Assuming raw materials costs are fixed, and dropping the price might 
sell more cars but would not raise total profits, the only available avenue to 
increase profit would be to decrease labor cost. Assume GA does so, 
announcing an across-the-board salary reduction of 20%, reducing its labor 
cost to $4 million and thereby immediately doubling its profits from 
$1 million to $2 million—not as good as in a typical year but much better 
than the year before.41 But why would labor put up with this, and why 
would a competitor not hire away the disgruntled workers? In periods of 
deep unemployment, labor has little choice; there are no other jobs as 
competitors are not hiring. Consequently, in effect, GA managed to shift 
the bulk of the costs of reduced sales due to the recession onto labor and 
away from capital, precisely because in a recession labor has nowhere else 
to go. 
Just like the cost of reduced sales during a recession, a corporation can 
allocate the cost of an income tax among capital, labor, and consumers as 
well. In a growing economy workers or consumers may have several 
choices. Thus, if a corporation tries to allocate the tax on workers (through 
lower wages, for example) workers will simply leave for a different job. 
This is effectively the Harberger result. In a deep recession, however, 
workers no longer have the option to leave, or at least to a much lesser 
extent, because of high unemployment. Meanwhile, a corporation, such as 
GA, presumably cannot raise prices in a recession because consumers have 
less money than when the economy was robust. Therefore, just like GA 
shifted a substantial amount of the cost from lower sales onto labor, GA 
would also have an incentive to shift its tax burden onto labor during 
periods of high unemployment.42 This is effectively the Atkinson and 
Stiglitz result. 
II. INTEGRATING MACROECONOMICS AND THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: 
THEORY AND EXTENSIONS 
A. A Brief Background on the Role of Fiscal Policy in  
Macroeconomic Theory 
As demonstrated in the example above, it is possible for 
macroeconomic conditions to distort microeconomic decisionmaking. It 
follows, therefore, that removing existing implicit tax-induced distortions 
can theoretically serve both to increase the overall efficiency of corporate 
hiring decisions from a microeconomic standpoint and, at the same time, 
 
41 For a discussion of the relative burden of a recession on labor and capital, see ANDREW SUM ET 
AL., CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUDIES, NE. UNIV., THE “JOBLESS AND WAGELESS” RECOVERY FROM THE 
GREAT RECESSION OF 2007–2009: THE MAGNITUDE AND SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH 
2011 I AND THEIR IMPACTS ON WORKERS, PROFITS, AND STOCK VALUES (2011). 
42 See Arulampalam et al., supra note 35, at 28–29. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1042 
supplement macroeconomic pro-employment policies.43 Would it not be 
simpler just to wait until there is a significant increase in unemployment 
and then implement a targeted tax break to stimulate the economy, rather 
than make permanent changes to the corporate income tax? The answer, as 
discussed below, lies in the development of modern macroeconomic 
theory, or more specifically, on a deep lack of consensus among modern 
economists on the workings of macroeconomic theory. 
As discussed above, neoclassical economics assumes an economy with 
no involuntary unemployment.44 The puzzle, therefore, faced by 
neoclassical economics, and continued to be faced to this day, has been to 
explain why there in fact was or is unemployment in the economy.45 John 
Maynard Keynes was the first modern economist to attempt to understand 
this by addressing the entirety of the economy in one theory.46 Keynes 
posited, very generally, that unemployment resulted from a lack of demand 
in the economy and that the solution to unemployment was therefore 
government support for increased demand.47 
Keynes’s theory was ultimately formalized through the “IS-LM” curve 
model.48 Based on the IS-LM model, traditional Keynesian macroeconomic 
theory holds that as demand drops during recessionary periods, government 
spending can offset this reduction in demand, either by directly purchasing 
goods and services or by putting money in the pockets of people who will 
use it to consume, and thus reduce unemployment.49 
As the economy emerged from World War II, economists began to 
question the Keynesian model.50 For example, one criticism of the 
 
43 See Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for 
Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 88–89 (2012). 
44 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
45 See Michael W.L. Elsby & Matthew D. Shapiro, Why Does Trend Growth Affect Equilibrium 
Employment? A New Explanation of an Old Puzzle, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1378, 1378 (2012) 
(“Explaining the variation in rates of employment over time has been a central question for labor and 
macroeconomics and for public policy for several decades.”). 
46 See ROGER E. BACKHOUSE, INTERPRETING MACROECONOMICS: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY 
OF MACROECONOMIC THOUGHT 7 (1995) (citing JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936)). 
47 The classic IS-LM model was developed by Hicks in 1937. See id. at 120; Michel De Vroey, 
Getting Rid of Keynes? A Survey of the History of Macroeconomics from Keynes to Lucas and Beyond 
2–5 (Nat’l Bank of Belg., Working Paper No. 187, 2010), http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/wp
187En.pdf. 
48 See De Vroey, supra note 47, at 4 (citing Franco Modigliani, Liquidity Preference and the 
Theory of Interest and Money, 12 ECONOMETRICA 45 (1944)). The IS-LM model has received increased 
attention and support from some economists in recent years. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Destructive 
Creativity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/
destructive-creativity-2. 
49 See Paul Krugman, IS-LMentary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011, 3:14 PM), http://krugman.blogs.ny
times.com/2011/10/09/is-lmentary. 
50 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 498–500 (6th ed. 2012). 
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Keynesian model was that it called for increased government spending to 
reduce unemployment, but most economic theory supported the idea that 
debt-financed government spending would lead to increased inflation and 
thus could increase unemployment.51 
In response, by the 1960s critics began asserting that stable monetary 
policy—the tool used to control inflation—should be the single tool used to 
impact employment, meaning that fiscal policy was mostly irrelevant (or 
even worse, harmful) to macroeconomic growth or stability.52 This was the 
primary insight of the “monetarist” school of economics, perhaps 
represented most famously by Milton Friedman.53 
Another criticism of the Keynesian model was that it relied on the 
concept of a multiplier effect where every dollar of demand stimulus 
generated more than one dollar of growth.54 The intuition behind the 
multiplier effect is that if the government provides one dollar in 
unemployment insurance, the recipient spends it at a store, which then can 
hire employees; these employees, in turn, can then consume at a different 
store, which can then hire even more employees, etc. In other words, a 
dollar of demand stimulus is worth a lot more than a dollar because it is 
used multiple times in the economy. Thus, the government was justified in 
borrowing one dollar to spend on one dollar of demand stimulus because it 
generated more than one dollar of growth. 
If the multiplier effect were not true, however, every dollar borrowed 
by the government and spent by recipients would have the exact same 
impact on the economy as a whole as if the government had simply left the 
dollar in the economy to begin with—that is, a dollar is a dollar. If this 
were the case, the government would be incurring debt (and paying 
interest) for no benefit or, even worse, actually harming the economy by 
redirecting resources to less efficient uses than would have occurred had 
the government left the money in the economy. The empirical evidence of 
 
51 Olivier Blanchard, What Do We Know About Macroeconomics that Fisher and Wicksell Did 
Not?, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1375, 1385–86 (2000). 
52 See, e.g., BACKHOUSE, supra note 46, at 127 (“[Fiscal] policy could not be used to stabilize the 
economy. The best policy was to minimize disturbances to the economy by ensuring that monetary 
policy did not itself become a source of disturbance.”); Alan J. Auerbach, Is There a Role for 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy?, in RETHINKING STABILIZATION POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 109, 144–45 (2002), http://www.frbkc.org/publicat/
sympos/2002/pdf/S02auerbach.pdf. 
53 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1867–1960 (1963). Monetarists such as Friedman have been considered critics of Keynes 
within the context of the IS-LM model, rather than critics of the model itself. See De Vroey, supra 
note 47, at 6–7; BACKHOUSE, supra note 46, at 121 (“Friedman’s . . . theory rests on a theoretical 
foundation that is just as informal as Keynes’s.”). 
54 For a good nontechnical summary of the concept, see John Quiggin, The Big Issues in 
Macroeconomics: The Fiscal Multiplier, COMMENT. ON AUSTRALIAN & WORLD EVENTS FROM A SOC.-
DEMOCRATIC PERSP. (Jan. 4, 2013), http://johnquiggin.com/2013/01/04/the-big-issues-in-macro
economics-the-fiscal-multiplier. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1044 
the multiplier effect is unclear, leading some to call for more targeted 
demand stimulus focused on high multiplier sectors55 and others to call for 
the end of demand stimulus altogether.56 
These challenges to traditional Keynesian macroeconomics formed the 
basis for the so-called “New Classical” movement in macroeconomics. The 
New Classical movement rejected the Keynesian approach and instead 
adopted microeconomic foundations—taking into account the reactions of 
rational actors in the model of the economy—into its model.57 The New 
Classical movement effectively replaced the Keynesian approach to 
macroeconomics with an attempt to extrapolate the macroeconomy based 
on rational reactions in a so-called “general equilibrium” framework.58 
Thus, the New Classical movement was much more than a challenge to the 
conclusions of Keynesian economics—it was a challenge to its 
fundamental premise.59 
Under the New Classical model, neither monetary nor fiscal policy 
mattered per se. Rather, what mattered was how policy differed from the 
expectations of the market. The conclusion was that maintaining a stable 
fiscal and monetary policy consistent with the rational expectations of the 
market was more important than using either to stimulate the economy as a 
whole. 
New Classical economists also criticized the contention that 
government borrowing to finance demand stimulus was essentially free. 
Instead, New Classical economists concluded that raising taxes to repay 
government debt or taxes used to pay for demand stimulus was itself a drag 
on the economy. To the extent the economic losses caused by higher taxes 
or higher interest rates resulting from government borrowing outweighed 
any stimulative effects of the initial spending, demand stimulus would 
always be a bad idea. Taken together, these attacks from New Classical 
economists caused traditional Keynesian macroeconomics to fall into 
disfavor.60 
A potential synthesis of neoclassical macroeconomics and Keynesian 
economics arose in response to the New Classical movement, sometimes 
referred to as New Keynesian macroeconomics. New Keynesian 
macroeconomics attempted to resolve the theory behind demand stimulus 
 
55 See JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34349, ECONOMIC STIMULUS 
PROPOSALS FOR 2008: AN ANALYSIS 17–18 (2008). 
56 See, e.g., Kevin A. Hassett, Why Fiscal Stimulus Is Unlikely to Work, 12 INT’L FIN. 75 (2009). 
57 See BACKHOUSE, supra note 46, at 123. 
58 This was represented perhaps most famously by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. See Alan S. 
Blinder, Keynes, Lucas, and Scientific Progress, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 130 (1987); De Vroey, supra 
note 47, at 1, 9–11. 
59 This is sometimes referred to as the Walrasian model of macroeconomics. See De Vroey, supra 
note 47, at 10. 
60 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer, 20 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 29, 32–34 (2006). 
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with the microeconomic foundations and empirical results underlying the 
New Classical movement, explicitly incorporating microeconomic concepts 
of behavioral responses into their models, among other things.61 
For example, New Keynesians proposed that prices could be “sticky” 
in that they did not float to match reductions in demand. If prices were 
sticky, inflation (and thus monetary policy) might have a short-term impact 
on unemployment, even if it did not have a long-term one.62 In such a case, 
for example, fiscal stimulus paid for with taxes on capital would have a 
positive multiplier effect because consumption would rise to the sticky 
price when the price could not drop to the lowered demand.63 This positive 
multiplier would justify government stimulus, but only if it were targeted at 
the appropriate group where there were sticky prices, and thus the largest 
multiplier. 
New Keynesian macroeconomics overcame a lot of the New Classical 
movement’s criticisms of traditional Keynesian macroeconomics, and 
could actually provide direct policy prescriptions, depending on the 
assumptions.64 A problem with New Keynesian economics, however, was 
that taking the lessons of the models to their logical extremes often led to 
contradictory policy results.65 This led critics to challenge the entire 
exercise of incorporating microeconomic foundations into macroeconomics 
 
61 See id. at 34–37; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Alternative Approaches to Macroeconomics: Methodological 
Issues and the New Keynesian Economics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3580, 
1993), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3580. 
62 See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard & Jordi Galí, Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model, 
39 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 35, 55 (2007). 
63 See, e.g., Tommaso Monacelli & Roberto Perotti, Redistribution and the Multiplier, 59 IMF 
ECON. REV. 630, 631–32 (2011), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/imfer/journal/v59/n4/
pdf/imfer201126a.pdf. Along these lines, there is a growing body of evidence supporting a higher 
multiplier effect than previously thought. See Olivier Blanchard & Daniel Leigh, Growth Forecast 
Errors and Fiscal Multipliers (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/13/1, 2013), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1301.pdf. Similarly, if interest rates were at the lower 
bound, a higher multiplier effect for government spending could be effective as compared to when 
interest rates were positive. See Lawrence Christiano et al., When Is the Government Spending 
Multiplier Large? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15394, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15394; Gauti B. Eggertsson, What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero 
Interest Rates? (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 402, 2009), 
http://newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr402.pdf. 
64 See, e.g., John F. Cogan et al., New Keynesian Versus Old Keynesian Government Spending 
Multipliers, 34 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 281 (2010); Bruce Greenwald & Joseph Stiglitz, New 
and Old Keynesians, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (1993). 
65 See David Colander, Post Walrasian Macroeconomics: Some Historic Links, in POST 
WALRASIAN MACROECONOMICS: BEYOND THE DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
46, 64–67 (David Colander ed., 2006). 
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at all, either returning to original Keynesian economics or adopting an 
entirely new approach.66 
One such new approach was the emergence of the Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium model, or DSGE. In short, the New Classical and New 
Keynesian models both adopted a general equilibrium approach to 
macroeconomics, incorporating microeconomic foundations into models to 
determine the overall effect on the economy. DSGE extended and 
formalized this, taking the empirical realities of the economy and monetary 
policy effects as a starting point and then attempting to craft robust 
macroeconomic models that would produce those results. To do so, it 
introduced “stochastic” changes, or random shocks, to determine changes 
to the general equilibrium model.67 While successful in achieving its stated 
goals, to critics, the complexity and assumptions necessary to effectuate 
DSGE models often made them nearly meaningless in terms of actual 
policy recommendations.68 
At present, it is safe to say that there is no consensus among 
Keynesians, Monetarists, New Classical theorists, New Keynesians, or 
DSGE theorists regarding the proper role of fiscal policy in addressing 
macroeconomic conditions.69 Correspondingly, the deep disconnect among 
policymakers as to the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stimulus is 
more a reflection of the state of disarray in modern macroeconomics than 
any fundamental policy or political disagreement. This has led some to 
claim that modern macroeconomic theory is not particularly helpful in 
setting real-world policy.70 But this cannot be completely correct. Taxes 
and spending clearly have an impact on the economy as a whole, and 
macroeconomic fiscal policy should be looked to at least in instances when 
traditional monetary policy tools appear exhausted.71 
Given what we know about the incidence of the corporate tax, what 
does it tell us about how corporate taxes should respond in the face of a 
recession? With traditional monetary policy stimulus virtually exhausted,72 
 
66 In other words, what good is a theory if it does not comply with empirics, and what good are 
empirics if they cannot lead to a theory? See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard, The State of Macro, 1 ANN. REV. 
ECON. 209, 223–25 (2009). 
67 See MICHAEL WICKENS, MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
APPROACH 4–10 (2d ed. 2011). 
68 See id. at 7 (“Krugman . . . claims that the macroeconomics of the last thirty years is 
spectacularly useless at best . . . .”). 
69 See Blanchard, supra note 66. 
70 See Giuseppe Fontana, Whither New Consensus Macroeconomics? The Role of Government and 
Fiscal Policy in Modern Macroeconomics 19 (The Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 563, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410615. 
71 See id.; John B. Taylor, Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 29 
(2000). 
72 See Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Outlook (Oct. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2012/lack
er_speech_20121015.cfm. 
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economists have recently returned to the idea of using fiscal policy as a 
form of macroeconomic stimulus.73 The problem with doing so, however, 
especially in the context of corporate income taxes, is that economists 
cannot agree on what form of fiscal stimulus is appropriate. For example, 
so-called supply-side theorists would say examples like GA in Part I.B of 
this Article prove that corporate taxes need to be lowered in a recession to 
improve employment, while so-called demand-side theorists would 
disagree, saying examples like GA prove that the problem is not corporate 
taxes but lack of demand for new cars.74 
Other critics respond that fiscal stimulus leads to budget deficits, 
which can actually be counterproductive if fears of government defaults, 
bailouts, or both lead to spikes in long-term interest rates.75 The response to 
this, of course, is to raise revenue to reduce budget deficits.76 Thus, 
demand-side proponents might oppose reductions in the corporate tax, but 
also support increasing the corporate tax in the face of a recession to pay 
for other demand stimulus.77 Supply-side theorists would contend that this 
is exactly backwards because increasing taxes on employers leaves less 
money to invest in new production, meaning less investment in growth and 
thus higher unemployment. 
But there is another option: firms could just pocket the money from 
tax cuts and continue to lay off workers.78 Assuming labor in a recession 
becomes highly inelastic, in that workers have few available options, 
capital has little incentive to share any tax savings with them, at least under 
a wage bargaining model. This does not necessarily mean demand-side 
proponents are correct, however. While it is true on average that increased 
cash flow to unemployed workers will tend to be consumed, increasing 
 
73 See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard et al., Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 199, 205–06 (2010). 
74 See, e.g., Jeffrey Miron, The Case Against the Fiscal Stimulus, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 
520–25 (2010). This Article generally only considers fiscal policy and not monetary policy, which 
could also be used to stimulate demand through lower interest rates or other increases in the money 
supply due to the assumption that monetary policy has been constrained or maximized. 
75 See, e.g., Gregory Hoelscher, New Evidence on Deficits and Interest Rates, 18 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 1 (1986). 
76 The problem, of course, is—who should be taxed? Under this approach, much like the saying 
famously attributed to Willie Sutton, go where the money is . . . , that is, tax owners of capital. See 
WILLIE SUTTON WITH EDWARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY WAS: THE MEMOIRS OF A BANK ROBBER 
(Broadway Books 2004) (1976). 
77 See Diane Lim Rogers, Why Cutting Taxes to Help the Economy Isn’t So Easy, 132 TAX NOTES 
301, 303 (2011). The reality of course is not as clean as a dollar-for-dollar increase in unemployment 
insurance paid for by an increase in corporate tax rates. Rather, one approach adopted during this 
current recession has been a payroll tax holiday for workers (intended to increase take-home pay for 
labor) without reducing corporate taxes. See Robert H. Frank, The Payroll Tax Needs a Vacation, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2011, at BU4; Nicola M. White, Payroll Tax Holiday Plan Draws Criticism from Left, 
129 TAX NOTES 1304 (2010). 
78 See Rogers, supra note 77, at 301–02. 
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aggregate demand, this does not necessarily mean that such increased 
demand would be high enough to stimulate corporations to increase hiring 
(or decrease layoffs).79 
Both theories think of taxes as a form of macroeconomic policy, 
although in different directions: increasing the amount of money in a 
particular area will lead to increased amounts of activity in that area.80 
What lessons can be taken away, then, for fiscal policy in the modern 
economy? Primarily that the lessons from macroeconomics cannot be 
ignored in crafting fiscal policy, but, at the same time, no one clear policy 
prescription emerges from modern macroeconomics. 
This does not mean that policymakers cannot use the lessons from 
macroeconomics to improve the design and structure of the modern 
corporate income tax. As recent events indicate, doing nothing is not 
neutral. To the extent the economy is fundamentally changing, the 
efficiency and distributive consequences of the corporate income tax must 
be taken into account in crafting any fiscal policy responses. 
For example, take the debate over so-called corporate integration. The 
integration debate concedes that corporations are efficient vehicles to 
collect taxes, as they are effectively large pools of capital, but argues that 
there should not be two layers of tax on corporations.81 Several different 
policies have emerged out of the integration debate, but two of the primary 
ones are the dividend exemption and shareholder tax credit models. Under 
the dividend exemption model, the corporation would pay tax on its income 
but not on its dividends paid to shareholders.82 Under the shareholder tax 
credit model, the corporation would pay tax on both its income and its 
dividends paid to shareholders, but the shareholders would be entitled to a 
credit equal to their pro rata share of the corporate tax paid.83 
Regardless of the details, the corporate integration proposals mostly 
assume that shareholders bear the bulk of the incidence of the corporate 
tax.84 If, however, labor bears a significant portion of the corporate tax, this 
 
79 See Deborah Maranville, Unemployment Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern 
Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2004). 
80 See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on 
Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2002). 
81 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX 
SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 1–14 (1992), available at http://www.treasury.gov/re
source-center/tax-policy/Pages/integration-paper.aspx#summary. 
82 See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income 
Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1769 (1999). 
83 See id.; R. Glenn Hubbard, Corporate Tax Integration: A View from the Treasury Department, 
7 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 122–23 (1993). 
84 For a more detailed description, see Adam H. Rosenzweig, Affirmative, in The Future of 
Corporate Tax Reform: A Debate—Resolution #2: “Be it resolved that, assuming integration is 
desirable, the best way to achieve it is by exempting dividends from taxation in shareholders’ hands,” 
33 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N NEWSQUARTERLY 10, 10–11 (2013). 
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analysis may not hold. For example, granting a dollar-for-dollar credit to 
shareholders for corporate tax paid could overcompensate shareholders 
who do not, in fact, bear the entire cost of the corporate tax. In fact, it could 
reinforce the incentive to shift the cost of the corporate tax onto another 
constituency, since shareholders would receive the credit regardless of who 
bears the cost of the tax. If true, this would undermine the efficiency 
analysis of a shareholder tax credit model, at least one designed to be dollar 
for dollar. To the extent the push for a shareholder tax credit integration 
model is efficiency driven, therefore, reconsideration may be necessary. 
The same analysis holds for any attempt to use the corporate income 
tax in a way that requires understanding its incidence. For example, the 
corporate tax has been looked to as a tool for combating unemployment 
over the past several years.85 But if the above incidence analysis is correct, 
the tools proposed and adopted could be ineffective or, even worse, 
counterproductive. 
Notice what such an approach does, and equally as important, does not 
do. By taking into account the impact of macroeconomic conditions on 
traditional microeconomic decisionmaking, previously unaccounted for 
distortions can be identified; correcting these distortions could, depending 
on all the moving parts, lead to efficiency gains in the income tax. But in 
addition, for the first time, since the improvement would take into account 
macroeconomic trends, it could also have a positive feedback effect on the 
macroeconomic condition of the economy. Contrast this to the more 
traditional use of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic tool, such as fixed-
dollar hiring tax credits intended to increase hiring and stimulate demand, 
in which distortions to individual employers’ decisionmaking are tolerated 
for potential macroeconomic benefits.86 
This is not to say that all monetary and fiscal responses to 
macroeconomic conditions are unnecessary or inappropriate, or to obviate 
the need for the Federal Reserve to set short-term interest rates or the 
government to adopt Keynesian-type stimulus or other responses. Rather, 
taking into account the impact of macroeconomic conditions into a 
traditional microeconomic analysis of the corporate income can uncover 
both efficiency benefits and macroeconomic benefits through a single 
mechanism. The remainder of this Article will consider one example of 
such an approach, the DST. 
B. Conceptualizing a New Fiscal Policy: An Introduction to the DST 
Corporate profits are at all-time highs while unemployment remains 
stubbornly high; it is unclear who will gain from any future growth—labor 
 
85 See, e.g., Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 101, 124 Stat. 
71, 72–73 (2010). 
86 See infra Part III.A.1. 
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or capital.87 In fact, stubbornly high unemployment has been the defining 
characteristic of the U.S. economy since the Great Recession of 2008. 
Regardless of the particular position, economists and policymakers seem to 
agree that their macroeconomic theories of fiscal policy are, at best, only 
indirectly related to unemployment.88 The incidence analysis in Part I 
demonstrates that corporate income taxes could well have played some role 
in creating or exacerbating such unemployment.89 So if the debate over 
fiscal policy turns primarily on “jobs, jobs, jobs,”90 why not directly tie tax 
rates to increasing jobs?91 This is the ultimate premise of the DST.92 
In essence, the DST takes the shifting elasticities of labor and capital 
in a recession and the resulting shift in the incidence of corporate tax on the 
margins as a given. Under this assumption, higher corporate taxes will tend 
to shift onto labor in a recession while savings from lower corporate taxes 
will tend to go to either consumers (in the form of lower prices) or capital.93 
To directly address unemployment, therefore, one must tie corporate taxes 
directly to employment. 
The DST does this by replacing the current fixed corporate tax rate 
with a formula. The formula begins on a year-to-year basis with the 
preferred initial corporate tax rate, which could be any politically 
determined amount as appropriate for corporations during the period in 
 
87 Irwin, supra note 33. 
88 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 77. 
89 See Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of Budget 
Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 564–65 (2007). 
90  Jim Kinney, Jobs Message Hammered Home, THE REPUBLICAN, May 28, 2011, at A05; Eugene 
Robinson, Dear GOP: Cuts Alone Won’t Cut It, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2011, at A17; Eugene Robinson, 
What’s the Big Idea?, WASH. POST, July 29, 2011, at A19. This is not necessarily the case, but it is an 
assumption that will be made for purposes of this Article, especially since under at least the Atkinson 
and Stiglitz model, increased employment in a world with nonmarket clearing wages will always 
increase welfare. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
91 Cf. Peter Orszag, Link U.S. Payroll Tax Holiday to Unemployment Rate, BLOOMBERG (June 30, 
2011, 7:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-30/payroll-tax-should-be-linked-to-un
employment-rate-peter-orszag.html. 
92 Directly tying tax policy to macroeconomic decisionmaking represents an emerging trend in the 
tax literature. See Yair Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy Through the Income Tax Code, 123 TAX 
NOTES 1575 (2009). What is unique about the DST is that it uses corporate tax incidence as the tool to 
tie corporate tax policy with macroeconomic policy, as opposed to a more generalized and indirect 
across-the-board increase or decrease in tax rate. 
93 Cf. Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini, Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial 
Countries, 15 ECON. POL’Y 47 (2000); see also José M. González-Páramo, Imperfect Factor Mobility, 
Unemployment, and the Incidence of Selective Capital Income Taxes 46 (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 
Working Paper No. 11, 2003), http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/libros/Investiga
ciones/Inves2003_11.pdf (“Thus, if the employment effect of the tax is positive (negative), policies 
intended to increase the degree of capital mobility will further increase (reduce) the level of 
employment, with the sensitivity of this relationship being greater the smaller is the initial degree of 
factor mobility. . . . This implies in turn that taxes which harm capital the most are best from the 
employment perspective.”). 
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which the economy is not in a period of high unemployment (under current 
law the corporate tax rate is 35%).94 This rate would then be increased or 
decreased each year on a corporation-by-corporation basis95 based on the 
particular corporation’s percentage increase or decrease in employment,96 
returning to the baseline rate in each subsequent year. In this manner, the 
corporate tax rate would directly relate to employers’ cost–benefit analysis 
in the decision to lay off workers or increase hiring.97 
A dynamic, self-adjusting tax rate like the one described above is not 
in itself a new idea.98 What is new is incorporating the concept of a 
dynamic, self-adjusting tax into the corporate income tax so as to minimize 
distortions to the incidence of the corporate tax caused by macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Returning to the GA example from Part I.B, but with the addition of a 
simplified corporate income tax, assume there is a 35% corporate income 
tax on the profits of the corporation. In a typical year, GA would earn a 
pretax profit of $5 million, incurring a tax liability of $1.75 million and 
leaving a net after-tax profit of $3.25 million for its shareholders. If we 
further assume that in a typical year GA has maximized the efficiency of its 
labor pool (meaning it cannot reduce salary because employees would 
simply go work somewhere else), the market will not bear any increase in 
the price of the cars (because buyers would just buy cars from somewhere 
else), and there is no untaxed competitive industry, all $1.75 million of tax 
is effectively borne by capital. 
Now assume that a deep recession arrives, with high, nationwide 
unemployment. There are two effects on the economy: first, as jobs become 
scarcer, employees at GA are less likely to find alternative employment, 
and second, as fewer people have jobs, there is less demand for GA’s cars. 
The combination of these two effects has a significant impact on the 
incidence of the corporate tax, holding everything else constant.99 GA 
 
94 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2012) (imposing 35% tax rate on corporations with taxable income 
exceeding $10,000,000). 
95 It is this targeted response, among other things, that differentiates the DST from other proposals 
to adjust the payroll tax to overall unemployment rates. See Orszag, supra note 91. 
96 The one-for-one nature of this proposal is mostly for simplicity and as a starting point. There is 
no reason why the formula could not change the tax rate by 0.5% for each 1% change in employment, 
or even change the tax rate by the log of the employment, or exponentially, or some other number. This 
would be both a political and empirical question, but for purposes of this part of the Article, a one-for-
one ratio is sufficient. Part III.A.3 will discuss some potential alternatives to take into account structural 
rather than firm-by-firm unemployment. 
97 For a general analysis of the marginal impact of fiscal policy on employment decisions, see Peter 
Birch Sørensen, Public Finance Solutions to the European Unemployment Problem?, 12 ECON. POL’Y 
221 (1997). 
98 See Vito Tanzi, A Proposal for a Dynamically Self-adjusting Personal Income Tax, 21 PUB. FIN. 
507 (1966) (proposing a self-adjusting personal income tax to prevent capital crowd out). 
99 Of course, in the real world not everything is held constant. Rather, all that is needed for the 
argument to hold, at least in part, is for the elasticity of labor to decrease more than the elasticity of 
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cannot raise prices in the face of a recession; if anything, it might need to 
drop prices in the face of decreased demand for cars. GA is able to reduce 
labor costs, however, since the employees of GA have nowhere else to go. 
There are many ways GA could shift the incidence of the tax onto labor, 
but for simplicity assume GA uses layoffs as the way to do so. 
Now assume GA’s sales drop 20% due to the recession. In the original 
example, GA correspondingly reduced its labor cost by 20%. By doing so, 
it continued to sell only 800 cars but increased its profits from $1 million to 
$2 million. As a result, however, GA increased its corporate income tax 
from $350,000 to $700,000. The owners of GA now face a choice. If they 
bear the incidence of this additional $350,000 in tax, the total profits after 
tax, after layoff, would be $1.3 million, as compared to $3.25 million 
before the recession. However, due to the recession, they have another 
choice—cut labor costs even further to increase the after-tax profits. 
Assume GA does so, saving $1 million and increasing pretax profits to 
$3 million and after-tax profits to $1.95 million.100 The effective result is 
that the bulk of the incidence of the corporate tax on the original $2 million 
of pretax profit has shifted from capital to labor, solely due to the change in 
the relative elasticities of the two caused by the recession.101 In other words, 
even though capital is losing real money in the recession, capital no longer 
bears any of the tax on these smaller profits. In contrast, prior to the 
recession, capital bore the entire cost of the corporate tax on the higher 
profits it earned. 
Of course, everyone (including capital) would prefer to sell more cars 
and make more money, even if it meant bearing the incidence of the 
corporate tax. Given the reality of decreased demand due to the recession, 
however, capital will have an incentive to shift some or all of the corporate 
tax burden to labor, at least as compared to pre-recession times. 
Continuing with the GA example, on an after-tax basis, the 
shareholders of GA earn $3.25 million in a pre-recession year and 
approximately $1.95 million in a recession year—a drop of approximately 
40%. A 40% drop in after-tax profit is significant to be sure, but nowhere 
near the 80% drop in before-tax profits. Essentially, in this example the 
interaction of the corporate income tax and the relative elasticities of 
 
capital during periods of deep unemployment. Assuming some alternative investment is available, 
either internationally or through U.S. Treasury Bonds, capital will always have some elasticity while 
labor is generally considered a much less elastic base. See Felix & Hines, supra note 36, at 3 (surveying 
studies finding up to 70% of the incidence of the corporate tax falls on labor when capital is mobile). 
100 GA would also have to increase productivity from the remaining employees to continue 
producing the 800 cars, but that does not impact the analysis so will be disregarded for purposes of this 
section. See infra Part III.A.4 for a discussion of productivity innovation. 
101 Of course in reality the numbers would be different in that the relative elasticities would be 
continuous and reduced pay and benefits such as pension contributions and health care contributions 
would also be used to reduce labor costs rather than just layoffs, but for purposes of this Article the 
example is sufficient. 
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capital and labor act as a form of implicit subsidy to capital, at the expense 
of labor, during periods of deep unemployment. 
Now introduce the DST. Under this scenario, GA would again face the 
choice of bearing the burden of the tax on $2 million of pretax profit or 
attempting to shift that burden to labor. In the case of the DST, however, 
the shift to labor is no longer free. Rather, the initial reduction in payroll of 
20% would increase the tax rate from 35% to 55%, meaning the total 
corporate tax bill due on $2 million of pretax profit would no longer be 
$700,000 but rather $1.1 million, leaving an after-tax profit of only 
$900,000. GA may try to increase this amount further by reducing payroll 
by another 20%, but doing so would increase the tax rate from 55% to 
75%, resulting in pretax profit of $3 million but after-tax profit of only 
$750,000, a net decrease. Assuming the shareholders of GA would rather 
keep the $900,000 of after-tax profit with 20% reduction in payroll than the 
$750,000 with 40% reduction in payroll, GA will not undertake the second 
reduction in payroll. In this manner, the automatic and self-adjusting nature 
of the DST would partially discourage shifting the incidence of the 
corporate tax onto labor, but would not prevent reductions in payroll 
arising as a result of real decreases in demand. At the same time, the 
increasing tax rate would serve to raise additional revenue precisely when 
needed most. 
In effect, under the DST, the shareholders of GA would choose to bear 
some of the incidence of the corporate tax rather than shift it onto labor—
the opposite of what occurs under the current fixed corporate tax rate. 
Although the nominal tax rate increased due to the initial round of layoffs, 
capital was still better off from a total after-tax profit standpoint as a result 
of the layoffs; but, unlike before the DST, capital would be worse off from 
the second round of layoffs due to the self-adjusting feature of the 
corporate tax rate under the DST. Thus, under the DST, job losses would 
be minimized as compared to what they otherwise would have been in the 
face of reduced sales. 
Unlike some fiscal stimulus proposals, however, these benefits would 
not accrue only while the economy is shrinking and unemployment is 
increasing. The reciprocal nature of the DST provides that if and when GA 
hires new employees, it will face a lower marginal tax rate as well. For 
example, assume in the next year demand returns and GA projects it will 
sell 1000 cars again, and thus has to add 20% more in payroll (through 
increased hours or hiring new workers). Absent the DST, GA would have 
pretax profit of $5 million and after-tax profit of $3.25 million. With the 
DST, the rate faced by GA would be reduced from 35% to 15%, resulting 
in after-tax profit of $4.25 million—an increase of $1 million. GA, 
knowing this to be the case, could use some or all of the $1 million to pay 
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for the increase in salary.102 In the subsequent year when GA retains all 
100 workers and sells 1000 cars, the rate will return to 35%. Since there 
was no change in employment in that year, GA would return to making $5 
million pretax profit and $3.25 million after-tax profit. 
In effect, the DST operated to raise tax revenue in the face of layoffs, 
which could be used to pay for demand stimulus, and then subsequently 
subsidized hiring by cutting taxes when corporations hired to meet 
increased demand. At the margins, on both the downturn and the upswing, 
the DST served to incentivize employers to invest in labor. The DST in 
effect, rather than providing a one-time subsidy to hiring only after massive 
job losses have already occurred, served to smooth the impact of the severe 
economic shock by slowing down the pace of layoffs during the downturn 
and accelerating the pace of hiring in the upswing.103 
The DST’s key insight is that macroeconomic trends can have 
microeconomic effects—in this case, high unemployment in the economy 
as a whole can affect the incentives of employers to hire and fire for tax 
purposes. It is for this reason that the DST differs from some other recent 
proposals to tie the tax rate to other metrics, such as taxing inequality,104 
notwithstanding that they share a similar mechanism. Instead of proposing 
to raise taxes as a form of punishment or to lower taxes as a form of 
subsidy, the DST attempts to reduce existing tax-induced distortions from a 
microeconomic standpoint while also addressing economy-wide issues 
such as high unemployment and low aggregate demand. Because the DST 
attempts to address both, it makes sense to examine how economists think 
about the interaction of the micro- and macroeconomic analyses. 
 
102 The match between the cost of hiring and the tax benefit is merely a coincidence of the numbers 
used in this example. Challenges in calculating the specific rate will be discussed in more detail in 
Part III. In reality, however, making a not unusual but somewhat strong assumption of constant 
employment over time (that is, a natural rate of unemployment) and equal per unit profit, the netting 
effect of the DST will wash out, meaning that it would have no net impact on an employer’s long-term 
efficient level of employment. For a description of the natural rate of unemployment, see MANKIW, 
supra note 50, ch. 22. 
103 By resetting to the baseline each year, the DST should smooth the swings of hiring and firing in 
the face of economic shocks caused by the implicit subsidy to employers, providing the macroeconomic 
employment benefit (holding monetary policy constant). Cf. MANKIW, supra note 50, at 495–503. 
104 See Ian Ayres & Aaron S. Edlin, Op-Ed., Don’t Tax the Rich. Tax Inequality Itself, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2011, at A29; Mark Schmitt, How Tax Reform Represents Obama’s Greatest Shot at Hope and 
Change, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 24, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/92529/debt-ceiling-
tax-reform-inequality. These proposals are in the nature of Pigouvian taxes, that is, taxing something 
bad to have less of it. See Agnar Sandmo, Pigouvian Taxes, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
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C. The DST as an Example of Integrating Macro and Micro Policy into 
Tax Law 
The challenge of the DST, or any fiscal policy response to 
macroeconomic conditions, is to craft a policy that can maximize the 
efficiency of the tax laws from a microeconomic perspective while also 
taking into account desired macroeconomic policy goals related to issues 
such as employment, interest rates, and public debt. 
The basic idea behind the DST is to recognize the economic reality 
that macroeconomic conditions can change the microeconomic analysis of 
the tax laws, and that microeconomic decisionmaking can have different 
macroeconomic consequences depending on the macroeconomic 
conditions. In this manner, the DST directly confronts an unspoken 
assumption in the tax literature: that very little is known theoretically or 
empirically about how these two interact or operate within the tax laws. 
Taking as a given, however, that the tax law applies to the economy as a 
whole, directly confronting this question becomes rather important, 
especially as policymakers increasingly look to fiscal policy as a 
macroeconomic tool.105 
The DST attempts to integrate these macroeconomic analyses of tax 
policy into a more traditional microeconomic efficiency analysis to see if 
any answers emerge. First, the DST asks if empirically identified 
macroeconomic trends can impact the microeconomic decisionmaking 
assumptions upon which tax policy analysis rests. Assuming the answer is 
yes—that is, that higher rates of unemployment lead employers to act 
differently with respect to taxes—the question that arises is whether a 
change to the tax law is available to minimize these distortions, and thereby 
minimize deadweight loss (or pure social waste), while raising the same 
amount of revenue.106 
The DST does this by crafting a policy that offsets incentives on an 
employer-by-employer basis. Specifically, the DST ensures employers no 
longer have an incentive to change from an efficient level of employment 
solely to shift the incidence of the corporate tax onto labor. Properly 
structured, as discussed in more detail below, the DST would reach only 
this tax-induced behavior, making it more efficient than current tax policy. 
Thus, from a traditional microeconomic standpoint, the DST makes sense 
as a tax policy tool, under the crucial but realistic assumption that changes 
in macroeconomic conditions distort incentives to employers on the 
margins. 
 
105 See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 92; see also Klein, supra note 17, at 590 (“In order to know what 
nontax variables need to be taken into account and to know how to correct for them so as to isolate the 
effect of the tax variable, it is necessary to have some theory about how the economy operates . . . .”). 
106 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
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But what about the DST’s impact on macroeconomic conditions more 
broadly? Could the DST be used to reduce unemployment across the entire 
economy? This is a much harder question, especially given the uncertain 
state of macroeconomic theory generally.107 Even so, looking at the DST as 
a whole, it is possible that the DST could achieve these macroeconomic 
goals under most modern theories of macroeconomics. 
The DST has two potential, and reciprocal, employment benefits. 
First, the DST removes the incentives of employers to increase 
unemployment during a downturn, at least as a means to shift the incidence 
of the corporate tax, which results in marginally less severe downturns in 
the business cycle. Second, the DST provides an incentive for employers to 
hire as the economy picks up, accelerating periods of growth out of a 
recession. 
Taken together, the DST’s employment benefits should have a 
smoothing effect on employment over the business cycle, which is 
important because of the concept of the natural rate of unemployment.108 
The natural rate of unemployment theory stands for the proposition that the 
economy, absent swings from the business cycle, has a single “proper” rate 
of unemployment. Divergences from this natural rate of unemployment are 
troubling because they indicate something is wrong, that is, the economy is 
either above or below its natural rate.109 Accordingly, stabilizing these 
swings under the natural rate of unemployment theory, such as would occur 
under the DST, would create macroeconomic benefits.110 
Even under a theory of macroeconomics that does not hold to a natural 
rate of unemployment, the DST should have a positive impact on growth. 
For instance, assuming a high multiplier effect of demand stimulus, the 
government should spend on demand stimulus during periods of high 
unemployment. The problem is that borrowing to do so can increase total 
debt in the economy. What this means is that, as the economy begins to 
grow again, and demand for credit increases, there will be less capital 
available to lend within the private sector. This, in turn, leads to spikes in 
long-term interest rates, which then undercut long-term growth and 
employment under this theory.111 The threat of long-term interest rate 
 
107 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeoff Between Inflation and 
Unemployment, 111 ECON. J. C45, C47–C48 (2001). 
109 See Hian Teck Hoon & Edmund S. Phelps, Macroeconomic Shocks in a Dynamized Model of 
the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 889 (1992); Edmund S. Phelps, 
Macroeconomics for a Modern Economy, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 543, 549–50 (2007). 
110 See Mankiw, supra note 50, ch. 22 (describing the natural rate of unemployment theory); see 
also Per Krusell et al., Is Labor Supply Important for Business Cycles? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17779, 2012), http://app.ny.frb.org/research/economists/sahin/KMRS4_
EFG.pdf. 
111 See, e.g., Olivier J. Blanchard, Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates and Economic 
Activity, 25 EUR. ECON. REV. 361, 379 (1984). 
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spikes, at least under this theory, makes debt-financed demand stimulus 
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. 
The potential remedy to this is a “credible commitment” by the 
government to pay down the debt as soon as the economy begins to grow 
again, although to date there has been little agreement as to what would 
constitute a sufficiently credible commitment to achieve this goal.112 The 
DST, by raising revenue during periods of demand stimulus and lowering 
revenue during periods of growth, potentially avoids this problem. From at 
least one macroeconomic standpoint, the permanent, reciprocal, and 
automatic nature of the DST should make it roughly revenue neutral over 
time,113 meaning fears of fiscal stimulus leading to huge budget deficits or 
even potential government default along the lines of Greece114 should be 
mitigated as well. Accordingly, fears of long-term interest rate spikes 
should be reduced under the DST as compared to other forms of demand 
stimulus. 
Lastly, since the DST allocates the costs and benefits of fiscal policy 
in a manner that, theoretically, should maximize the multiplier effect,115 it 
should find support under New Keynesian approaches that favor focusing 
demand stimulus on particular sectors of the economy rather than simply 
stimulating the general economy as a whole. It is the unique attempt to 
combine the benefits from all these disparate macroeconomic theories that 
distinguishes the DST from other types of fiscal stimulus. 
III. IMPLEMENTING A DYNAMIC, SELF-ADJUSTING CORPORATE TAX RATE: 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 
A. Theoretical Benefits and Limitations of the DST 
1. Why Not a Simple Hiring Tax Credit?—The immediate question 
that arises from any discussion of a proposal to use the tax system to reduce 
 
112 See James D. Hamilton & Marjorie A. Flavin, On the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A 
Framework for Empirical Testing, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 808 (1986). 
113 In general, raising revenue to offset fiscal stimulus through a permanent and automatic 
mechanism such as the DST could theoretically satisfy the “credible commitment” necessary to 
minimize the concern over future deficits and thus increases in the long-term interest rate. See 
Countries Face Choices to Reduce Debt and Deficits, IMF SURVEY (Dec. 17, 2010), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/POL121710A.htm (“Fiscal stimulus needs to be 
combined with a credible commitment to a medium-term fiscally responsible policy . . . .” (quoting 
Alan Auerbach)). 
114 See Michael G. Arghyrou & John D. Tsoukalas, The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes, 
Mechanics and Outcomes (CESifo, Working Paper No. 3266, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1719032. 
115 See, e.g., Tommaso Monacelli & Roberto Perotti, Redistribution and the Multiplier 36 
(Innocenzo Gasparini Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 409, 2011), available at http://econ
papers.repec.org/paper/igiigierp/409.htm. 
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unemployment is: why not just directly pay corporations to hire people?116 
Why not use a relatively simple fixed-dollar hiring tax credit instead of this 
more complicated mechanism? For example, why not wait until the 
National Bureau of Economic Research declares a recession to implement 
an across-the-board or targeted tax break for employers? 
A fixed-dollar tax credit approach might satisfy one theory of 
macroeconomic stimulus, but it fails others. Since macroeconomics as a 
field cannot say with certainty which approach dominates, it is difficult to 
justify basing policy on only one theory over another. This is not to say that 
any one fiscal policy approach necessarily must displace all others; in fact, 
a policy such as the DST would not displace the need for broader 
macroeconomic policy more generally, whether monetary or fiscal. It is 
even possible that specific tax proposals such as a fixed-dollar hiring credit 
could be a good idea in addition to the DST. In fact, the DST is structured 
to make macroeconomic conditions more stable and thus potentially make 
tolls such as the fixed-dollar hiring credit more robust. 
The real problem with temporary and targeted tax cuts as the only or 
primary means of addressing unemployment in the face of a recession is 
that they could prove distortive to the efficient allocation of resources, 
meaning not only that such a proposal could have little macroeconomic 
benefit, but that it also could potentially increase deadweight loss. Only a 
permanent, comprehensive approach can address all of these considerations 
at the same time. Of course, permanent solutions raise other, sometimes 
difficult, questions, but none of these negate the benefits of taking a 
comprehensive look at fiscal policy from both a micro- and 
macroeconomic point of view. 
Assuming one were forced to choose between fiscal policy 
instruments, there are three reasons why the DST would be preferable to a 
simple fixed-dollar hiring tax credit. First and foremost, the largest benefit 
of the DST is that it is tailored to individual employers. Each employer best 
knows its own business and its labor needs. The purpose of the DST is to 
allow employers to make the most efficient employment decisions absent 
taxes and only then have the tax mechanism kick in to prevent layoffs from 
being used solely to shift the incidence of the corporate income tax. It does 
so by using tax rates, which apply only to taxable income (gross profits less 
expenses, such as wages); as wages go down, profits go up (holding all else 
equal). The more a company increases profits through layoffs or other labor 
costs, the more it will pay through the DST, not only through the increased 
rate, but also by applying the increased rate to a larger taxable income base. 
By using rates applied to taxable income, the DST actually has two self-
 
116 Such an approach would more closely resemble a Pigouvian tax rather than an attempt at 
maximizing the efficiency of the tax laws on its own terms. See supra note 104. Regardless, this 
approach has effectively been U.S. policy in recent years. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 102, 124 Stat. 71, 75–76 (2010). 
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adjusting features, the rate and the base. Conversely, if a company were 
unable to make a profit despite laying off workers, the DST would have no 
negative impact for the simple reason that any tax rate multiplied by zero 
profits will always be zero.117 
By contrast, any fixed-dollar, “one size fits all” solution would not 
have this automatic adjustment quality in that it would be worth the same 
amount per employee regardless of the profits of the employer.118 Thus, 
fixed-dollar credits do not necessarily target those firms that need the most 
help, nor do they necessarily increase total employment if the only firms 
that claim the credits would have hired anyway even absent the credit.119 
Second, a fixed-dollar tax credit does not work on both the downside 
and the upside. A credit for hiring new workers might provide an incentive 
to hire on the margins, but it does nothing to dissuade tax-induced layoffs 
in the first place. To the extent the problems created in the modern 
economy are due to the intense and sudden increase in unemployment 
during economic shocks, fixed-dollar hiring tax credits do nothing to 
prevent this. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, the reciprocal nature of the DST 
is intended to undo an existing tax distortion to hiring decisions, which, 
holding all else equal, creates a deadweight loss in the economy. Any “one 
way” hiring credit not incorporating this feature, therefore, would be 
addressing the distortion to hiring decisions on an imprecise level, if at all. 
In other words, for a fixed-dollar credit to work, one would have to hope 
that the size and scope of the fixed-dollar credit is precise enough to offset 
both the hesitancy to hire out of the recession and the implicit subsidy to 
layoffs in the first place; any subsidy in excess of the efficient amount 
would lead to deadweight loss from inefficient hiring and any subsidy less 
than the efficient amount would not return employers to the efficient hiring 
level. The DST, by being reciprocal, automatic, and more finely tuned, 
minimizes this risk. Relatedly, a fixed-dollar credit creates incentives for 
employers to cheat the system by firing workers (which would have no tax 
penalty) and then hiring new workers to replace them, solely to obtain the 
credit.120 The DST does not create this incentive. 
 
117 In fact, rather than be harmful, the higher tax rate of the DST could actually prove beneficial to 
loss companies by increasing the value of their deductions. See infra Part III.B.2. 
118 This is only completely true if the credit was refundable, but is still partially true even if it is 
not. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006). 
119 See infra Part III.A.3. There is evidence that the bulk of the benefit from fixed-dollar credits do 
in fact benefit only such inframarginal hiring, thus causing pure waste from an economic standpoint. 
See, e.g., John H. Bishop & Mark Montgomery, Does the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Create Jobs at 
Subsidized Firms?, 32 INDUS. REL. 289, 302 (1993). 
120 See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act § 102(b) (“For purposes of this section, the 
term ‘retained worker’ means any qualified individual (as defined in section 3111(d)(3) or section 
3221(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)—(1) who was employed by the taxpayer on any date 
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Third, any ad hoc solution faces two political economy problems: 
(1) the need to pass any hiring credit through Congress and (2) the inability 
of employers to plan for the credit in advance.121 The self-adjusting nature 
of the DST addresses both of these problems. Because the DST adjusts tax 
rates automatically, it would only require one vote by Congress—at the 
time of enactment.122 Further, as discussed in more detail below, having the 
self-adjusting tax embodied in current law would require corporate 
employers to take the DST into account when reporting earnings and tax 
liabilities on their yearly public financial statements, potentially giving the 
DST current influence on corporate behavior with respect to future 
decisions.123 This certainty supplements the smoothing effect over time, 
providing an additional benefit over ad hoc solutions. 
2. Why Only Public Corporations?—On its face, perhaps the DST’s 
toughest challenge in combating actual unemployment rates is that not all 
employers are corporations (or at least corporations subject to an entity-
level income tax). There are sole proprietorships, partnerships (including 
limited liability companies treated like partnership for federal income tax 
purposes), S Corporations, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs),124 and 
tax-exempt organizations including Section 501(c)(3)125 organizations,126 
among others, which represent a sizeable percentage of all employment in 
the country. If employees working for corporations do not make up the 
bulk of workers, why spend so much time creating a special tax rate only 
for corporations to solve the unemployment problem?127 
The short answer is: those entities do not pay income tax, so the 
income tax cannot be used as a fiscal tool to impact their behavior. The 
longer answer is: the DST is uniquely suited toward corporations due to the 
nature of the incidence of the corporate tax, which does not apply to 
entities that do not pay a net income tax.128 
 
during the taxable year, (2) who was so employed by the taxpayer for a period of not less than 52 
consecutive weeks, and (3) whose wages (as defined in section 3401(a)) for such employment during 
the last 26 weeks of such period equaled at least 80 percent of such wages for the first 26 weeks of such 
period.”). The DST avoids these problems by effectively penalizing the layoffs as well as subsidizing 
the hiring. 
121 See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 752, 782 (2010). 
122 Cf. id. at 771, 796. 
123 See infra Part III.B.2. 
124 There is some evidence that the use of REITs is actually growing as well. See Nathaniel Popper, 
Restyled as Real Estate Trusts, Varied Businesses Avoid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2013, at A1. 
125 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
126 E.g., organizations such as Washington University in Saint Louis. See University’s Tax Status, 
WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://tax.wustl.edu/general/Pages/status.aspx (last visited June 8, 2014). 
127 By contrast, virtually all employers pay payroll tax. See I.R.C. § 3111. 
128 While the incidence analysis applies to all types of taxes, the unique nature of the income tax on 
corporations as an entity separate from its owners makes the incidence analysis unique from other taxes, 
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In addition, focusing on large corporations takes into account the 
difference in size of the employment base. For example, if an employer 
with five employees were to lay off one employee, under the DST that 
employer would face a 20% increase in its marginal tax rate (assuming all 
employees were equally compensated and the tax rate adjusted 1% for each 
1% change in wage base). 
Regardless of the relative benefits of marginally inducing employers 
to bear the cost of the corporate tax, such a large increase would appear on 
its face to be killing a gnat with a sledgehammer.129 Of course, this could be 
resolved by changing the formula such that employers with a small number 
of employees would face a lower marginal tax rate increase, say only 10% 
of the decrease in their wage deduction, in which case the hypothetical 
employer above would face only a 2% marginal tax rate increase. The 
problem is that such a formula would result in negligible impacts on large 
employers. For example, if a corporation employed 100,000 workers and 
laid off 1000, that would represent only a 1% drop in employment 
(assuming the workers are equally compensated for ease of calculation). As 
a result, the employer would face only a 0.1% increase in marginal tax rate, 
an amount unlikely to have any effect. 
This does not mean that it would be impossible to create two DSTs, 
one for large employers and one for small employers, but such a bifurcated 
approach would significantly increase the complexity of the proposal 
without necessarily targeting large amounts of workers. Thus, if choosing 
between the two, on a case-by-case basis a DST on large employers would 
have a greater impact because large corporations are the only ones that 
engage in mass layoffs and mass hiring at any one point in time 
(notwithstanding that small employers as a whole employ almost half of all 
workers).130 
Assuming this is correct, what remains is drawing a meaningful line 
between large and small employers. The Internal Revenue Code currently 
provides two models to do so. The first would be to define large employers 
based on some arbitrary number of employees, revenues, or assets. For 
example, the Internal Revenue Code exempts employers who employ at 
least fifty employees in a separate line of business from certain pension 
obligations131 and grants special reduced capital gains rates to shareholders 
of corporations with gross assets below $50 million.132 The other approach 
 
including flow-through entities which act solely as accounting mechanisms. See Harberger, supra 
note 5, at 217–20. 
129 Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court 
uses a sledgehammer to kill a gnat . . . .”). 
130 See Regina F. Burch, Financial Regulatory Reform Post-financial Crisis: Unintended 
Consequences for Small Business, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 409, 410 (2010). 
131 I.R.C. § 414(r). 
132 Id. § 1202(a), (d). 
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would be to define large employers as only publicly traded corporations. 
For example, the Internal Revenue Code denies the ability to be treated as 
fiscally transparent (with some limited exceptions) to publicly traded 
entities133 and limits the application of certain “golden parachute” rules only 
to publicly traded corporations.134 So which should it be—size or public 
trading? 
Based solely on the criteria of the Internal Revenue Code, no one 
answer necessarily jumps out as obviously correct. The answer can become 
clearer, however, when taking into account benefits outside the bounds of 
the Internal Revenue Code. In particular, using public trading rather than 
number of employees as the dividing line between small and large 
employers begins to look especially attractive once one takes into account 
nontax considerations. First, and perhaps most importantly, public trading 
is a “sticky” line135 in that going public is already quite costly, so those 
companies that go public must perceive significant value in doing so.136 For 
instance, corporations desire to be publicly traded for a number of 
reasons—cheaper access to capital markets, monetization by existing 
shareholders, ease of valuation, equity compensation of management, 
among others—but not necessarily for income taxes. In other words, if a 
corporation wants to go public, it is not for tax reasons.137 
Presumably, therefore, a corporation would be unlikely to change its 
decision to go public solely because it may face the DST as a public 
corporation as opposed to a fixed income tax rate as a private corporation. 
This is especially true considering the DST could result in a lower tax rate 
for the corporation if, for instance, the corporation planned on using 
proceeds from its initial public offering to hire new workers as part of a 
business expansion. Conversely, corporations do not necessarily go private 
(that is, cease to be publicly traded) primarily for tax reasons. For example, 
many corporations go private because they are being purchased by private 
equity funds or other financial buyers for financial reasons.138 
 
133 Id. § 7704. 
134 Id. § 162(m)(1)–(2). 
135 This is often thought of as the ideal place to impose a tax since a tax law which does not affect 
behavior raises revenue without imposing a deadweight loss on society. See Weisbach, supra note 106. 
But see Terrance O’Reilly, Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2008). 
136 See Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 649 (2008). 
137 See Stephen J. Redner, Thinking of Going Public? Think Twice, Then Read the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 521, 522 (2002); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a 
New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 639, 641–43 (2009). 
138 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Essay, Deconstructing Equity: Public 
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 233–35 (2008). 
Even this may not be as large as once thought, however. See Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: 
Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245 (2009). Other 
corporations may go private because they become delisted from being too small to qualify for trading 
on the exchange. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey et al., Down and Out in the Stock Market: The Law and 
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This does not address one potential problem with going private, that is, 
financial buyers who plan to lay off a substantial number of workers as cost 
savings. Under this scenario, a company could engage in layoffs as a 
private company, which, if done while public, would have led to a higher 
tax rate. This effectively makes it cheaper for financial buyers to acquire 
public companies (at least on the margin) for which it might have otherwise 
been more efficient to remain public. This can be addressed, however, by 
adding a transition rule. Specifically, the DST could apply to a corporation 
for the entire taxable year in which it went private. Thus, if a buyer wanted 
to use layoffs to finance an acquisition, it would have to artificially wait 
until the beginning of the subsequent year to do so or artificially wait until 
the end of the taxable year to acquire the company, imposing real risk in 
the transaction.139 This risk could be avoided, however, by structuring the 
transaction so it closes at the end of the taxable year of the public company. 
There are limits to this,140 but if they prove insufficient, one solution could 
be to “taint” the year following a year in which a company goes private by 
making it subject to the DST as well. Regardless, this issue should only 
apply to a relatively small number of companies and solutions are 
available. 
Contrast this to using number of employees (or payroll deductions) as 
the dividing line between large and small employers. The primary issue 
with using such an arbitrary bright line is that it creates a “cliff effect”—an 
extremely high marginal tax on the action that crosses the line.141 Given this 
cliff effect, firms face a choice: choose not to cross the line, or find some 
other way to do so without falling off the cliff. This leads to the single 
biggest problem with using number of employees as the dividing line: it 
creates a powerful incentive for employers to “hide” full-time employees 
by converting them into independent contractors or part-time workers.142 If 
this incentive causes small employers to actually change their employment 
methods from what would be preferred, it would be undesirable in that it 
would impose a deadweight loss on society.143 
 
Economics of the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683 (2008). These situations only serve to further 
the argument that using public trading as a proxy for size in the DST may be preferable. 
139 This is precisely the approach adopted in other similar areas of the law, such as claiming a 
foreign tax credit on dividends and certain similar items of income. See I.R.C. § 901(k), (l). 
140 For example, one way to close the year would be to treat the acquisition as a purchase of assets, 
but any built-in gain would effectively be subject to double tax, significantly raising the cost. 
141 See Stephen D. Holt & Jennifer L. Romich, Marginal Tax Rates Facing Low- and Moderate-
Income Workers Who Participate in Means-Tested Transfer Programs, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 259 
(2007). 
142 See Myron Hulen et al., Independent Contractors: Compliance and Classification Issues, 
11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 13 (1994); Susan Schwochau, Note, Identifying an Independent Contractor for 
Tax Purposes: Can Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163 (1998). 
143 See Weisbach, supra note 106. 
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Likewise, if this incentive results in employers simply playing games 
to make it appear that their full-time employees are really something else 
or—even worse—flat out defrauding the government, it would also be 
undesirable because it would increase transaction costs (for example, by 
paying for tax advisors) with no corresponding increase in social benefit. In 
other words, since number of employees is less sticky than public trading, 
both in actual and planning terms, it is a less desirable line to use in 
imposing the DST. Using revenues as the dividing line suffers from the 
same malady.144 
3. Inframarginal Hiring.—One of the thorniest problems for any tax 
incentive is the problem of inframarginal behavior, or behavior that would 
have occurred absent the tax incentive. Inframarginal behavior is troubling 
because a tax incentive is inefficient in such a case, since the taxpayer 
would have undertaken the behavior even absent the tax incentive. Yet, the 
taxpayer receives a windfall in the form of the tax benefit.145 Inframarginal 
behavior is particularly troubling in the case of employment, since 
presumably the primary reason for companies to hire or fire workers is for 
business reasons, not tax reasons. 
The immediate response to this concern is that the DST is no worse, 
and should be better than, any other fiscal employment stimulus.146 
Providing a hiring tax credit or payroll tax holiday to hiring workers is also 
available regardless of whether the hiring would have occurred absent the 
tax incentive.147 Given the nature of the world, it just is not possible to 
create a counterfactual scenario after enacting a tax incentive in which the 
 
144 In addition, it is possible that some companies have large revenues with very small payrolls, for 
example if they are driven primarily by owning intellectual property. For instance, it is not hard to 
imagine a company consisting of a small number of individuals who invent the greatest computer 
software program of all time generating massive revenues with only a small staff. The primary 
counterexample for a time was Facebook, which generated massive revenue and had a large employee 
base, and yet remained private; Facebook was effectively forced to go public rather than file disclosures 
with the SEC as a private company due to having over 500 shareholders. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 43 (2011), http://www.hb
lr.org/?p=1028; Evelyn Rusli et al., The Education of Zuck, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2012, at BU1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/technology/facebooks-mark-zuckerberg-at-a-turning-
point.html?pagewanted=all. 
145 See Michelle Scholastica Paul, Bridging the Gap to the Microfinance Promise: A Proposal for a 
Tax-Exempt Microfinance Hybrid Entity, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1383, 1402–04 (2010). 
146 See Batchelder et al., supra note 118, at 45–46 (arguing that a tax incentive need not be optimal 
but rather the best “bang for its buck”). 
147 See Bishop & Montgomery, supra note 119. This is the case for broad-based credits, but 
targeted credits such as the previous tax credit for hiring Vietnam veterans carry less concern. See 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. 
REV. 973, 1033–35 (1986) (“The credit for hiring economically disadvantaged Vietnam veterans is a 
tax incentive which can survive both substantive and procedural scrutiny.”). Under the “nothing new 
under the sun” heading, the United States recently enacted a similar hiring tax credit for Iraq and 
Afghanistan war veterans. See Vow to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-56, §§ 201–265, 
125 Stat. 711, 712–33. 
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incentive is not part of the law. Thus, if it is agreed that some hiring tax 
incentive is necessary, a more directly tailored tax incentive, such as the 
DST, is more efficient than a broad-based fixed-amount hiring credit, even 
if the DST is subject to the inframarginal problem.148 
In this sense, however, the main drawback of the DST is the flip side 
of one of its main strengths—that it is permanent. For this reason, it will 
always apply to some hiring that would have occurred absent the DST, 
unless one were to make the nonsensical assumption that no change in 
employment would ever occur absent the DST. Theoretically, however, it is 
possible that the DST would not impact efficient levels of hiring in the long 
run because it is reciprocal, meaning the detriment when the rate goes up 
would be offset by the benefit when the rate goes down.149 
Even if the reciprocal nature of the DST did not result in completely 
offsetting rates in the long run,150 the inframarginal problem should not 
apply to the DST because it is intended to apply only to those changes in 
payroll meant to shift the incidence of the corporate tax away from capital 
and onto labor and not to any “real” employment decisions. The problem 
with this answer, however, is building a rate mechanism in the real world 
that would exempt “real” employment decisions and impact incidence-
based decisions. To do so, ideally there would be some proxy for “real” 
changes in employment on an employer-by-employer basis, which could be 
backed out of the calculation, thereby reaching only payroll decisions 
applicable to shifting the incidence of taxes. 
One possibility would be for the DST mechanism to change tax rates 
based on the percentage change in payroll for a corporation less the 
percentage change in national unemployment rate for the same period. This 
would allow the DST to capture an approximation of the firm-specific 
change in employment as opposed to systemic changes in employment. In 
other words, this approach would assume that changes in the national 
unemployment rate reflect the inframarginal changes in employment by a 
particular firm, and then only apply the DST to changes in excess of the 
inframarginal changes. 
This may not necessarily make sense, however, considering national 
changes in unemployment are national averages and do not take into 
account regional or sectoral differences in employment levels. For 
example, certain states, such as California and Michigan, have suffered 
 
148 Cf. Aki Kangasharju, Do Wage Subsidies Increase Employment in Subsidized Firms?, 
74 ECONOMICA 51 (2007). 
149 See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
150 This could be due to limitations on the ability to claim deductions, limitations on carrybacks or 
carryforwards over years, or changes in the tax rate over time, among others. See Deborah H. Schenk, 
Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 428–31 (2000). 
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much deeper unemployment than other states in recent years.151 Similarly, 
certain industries, such as construction, have suffered much deeper losses 
than other industries, such as finance and health care.152 Thus, it might be 
more appropriate to have a regionally or sectorally adjusted DST, backing 
out the specific unemployment rate applicable to a particular employer and 
then applying the DST to other changes in firm-by-firm employment. 
The problem with taking these regional and sectoral differences into 
account is that they still remain a rough proxy for individual firm 
inframarginal hiring, although possibly a better one than national 
unemployment. Thus, it may be more appropriate to analyze each firm’s 
specific employment decisions with its specific profits as compared to 
profits of competitors in its field. In this manner, issues common to all 
competitors in a field would “wash out” and only firm-specific 
employment decisions would remain. 
For a simplistic example, assume an industry has two competitors: 
General Automotive (GA) and United States Automotive (USA). GA has 
pretax profits of $1 million and payroll of $2 million in Year 1, and USA 
has pretax profits of $2 million and payroll of $4 million in Year 1. Both 
GA and USA suffer a 25% reduction in sales in Year 2. USA reduces its 
payroll by 12.5%, resulting in a payroll of $3.5 million and a profit of $2 
million in Year 2. GA, however, reduces its payroll by 25% causing payroll 
to drop to $1.5 million and pretax profits to increase to $1.25 million (for 
the purposes of this example, presumably shifting some of the incidence of 
the corporate tax onto labor). As a result, USA would have no increase in 
its tax rate under the DST, while GA would face an increase of 12.5% in its 
tax rate under the DST. 
There are a few problems with such an approach, however. The first 
problem is that certainty becomes reduced, thus diminishing some of the 
DST’s incentive effect. If a company does not have access to the 
employment decisions of competitors, it will not know what effect any 
given level of change in its employment will have on its tax rate. Second, 
such an approach substantially increases the complexity of administering 
the DST because before a tax rate could be calculated, the taxpayer would 
have to identify which companies are “competitors” and compare changes 
in payroll among the competitors before a tax rate could be calculated. 
Even assuming this were possible, it makes using the wage deduction on 
the face of the tax return difficult because tax returns are confidential and 
thus the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cannot share one corporation’s 
payroll date with another corporation.153 Conversely, such an approach 
 
151 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Regional and State 
Employment and Unemployment—September 2011 (Oct. 21, 2011). 
152 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment 
Situation—October 2011, tbl.A-14 (Nov. 4, 2011). 
153 I.R.C. § 6103 (2012). 
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raises the specter of collusion among employers in sectors with few actors 
and high barriers to entry. Competitors would have a huge incentive to 
collude and agree to consistent levels of hiring and layoffs solely to 
maximize the rent extraction from labor, much in the same way employer 
collusion can extract rent from labor more generally.154 For these reasons, 
even if it is a more blunt approach, it is arguably preferable to use publicly 
available data that cannot be manipulated, such as regional or sectoral 
changes in employment, rather than the more difficult to determine and 
easier to manipulate taxable profits of individual firms. 
Other proxies might be possible as well, such as using a weighted 
average or a three-year average of employment changes, which would 
smooth and net out the effects of inframarginal hiring by averaging the 
effects over several years instead of looking on a single year-to-year 
basis.155 Of course, no method would perfectly match the real-world 
mechanism with the theoretical goal of acting only on the incidence of 
corporate tax. Nonetheless, such proxies could result in fiscal stimulus 
being more closely tailored to the ideal than other tax incentives for 
employment, which even more indirectly address unemployment through 
macroeconomic effects.156 
4. Efficient Layoffs: Employment and Innovation.—A similar 
concern to inframarginal hiring is efficient layoffs. Assume an employer 
faces a substantial reduction in demand due to a recession. Rather than 
reduce compensation to shift the cost of reduced sales onto the existing 
labor pool, the employer could innovate a new process to manufacture a 
good of equal quality that requires 20% less labor to produce. This increase 
in production means that the marginal cost per unit of good decreases, 
thereby increasing efficiency and thus social surplus. The result, however, 
is a reduction in employment, which under the DST would result in a 
higher marginal tax rate. 
Traditional microeconomic efficiency analysis would say that 
innovation is good because it increases total social surplus, even if it results 
in the loss of a job for a particular employee.157 While there could be a 
legitimate debate between employment versus innovation as the source of 
 
154 See Anthony B. Sanders, Multiemployer Bargaining and Monopoly: Labor–Management 
Collusion and a Partial Solution, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 337 (2011). 
155 Cf. Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 395 (2003); Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss 
Offsets, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 709 (1981). 
156 See Bishop & Montgomery, supra note 119; cf. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable 
Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 
241–42 (2009). 
157 In more technical terms, innovation provides Kaldor–Hicks but not Pareto efficiency. See 
generally Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 
(1991). 
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social policy, the analysis changes significantly when the law basically 
chooses one over the other. This is the potential criticism of the DST—that 
it favors employment over innovation and thus could be inefficient from a 
microeconomic standpoint. There are several reasons why this would not 
be the case, however, or at least why this would be less worrisome than it 
may first appear. 
First, innovation does not always, or even most of the time, result in 
reduced payroll. Rather, innovation can be a way to increase productivity 
out of existing resources, including labor. In such a case, an employer 
could increase productivity with no decrease in total payroll and thus no 
change in its marginal tax rate under the DST. Accordingly, in many 
circumstances, the DST would simply result in an employer facing the 
default statutory tax rate. Since the tax rate would remain the same, the 
decision to innovate should not be affected by the DST. 
Similarly, the DST, being a rate mechanism, applies only to profits. 
Thus, the DST would not have any marginal effect on changes in 
innovation or productivity that do not raise net profits. This could occur, 
for example, if increases in productivity merely offset changes in demand 
during and after a recession. In particular, the DST would have no impact 
on the decision to innovate as a way to maintain profitability in any given 
year because the DST applies annually. For example, if in Year 1 a firm 
increased productivity and fired workers in response to a decrease in 
demand, there would be no increase in net profits and thus no marginal 
effect, even though the tax rate would be increased under the DST due to 
the reduction in payroll. But in Year 2, if demand increases, the increased 
productivity from Year 1 would lead to much higher profits with no change 
in workforce in Year 2, meaning that under the DST the tax rate would not 
go up on these higher profits. Thus, the only impact from the increased tax 
rate in Year 1 would be inframarginal and there would be no impact at all 
on profits in Year 2. 
If, however, a firm increases productivity and all else is held constant, 
there will be an increase in net profits. This, in turn, means the firm would 
face higher tax rates on those marginal profits under the DST, potentially 
discouraging some efficient innovation. There is no way to know what 
effect the higher marginal tax rates will have on a particular innovation 
with increased profits, however. Even with the higher marginal rates, net 
after-tax profits should increase because the benefits of innovation tend to 
be discontinuous; that is, a single innovation leads to a jump in cost savings 
or productivity which continues going forward. Thus, employers would 
only decline to pursue the innovation if the one-year tax increase under the 
DST exceeded the present value of all the increased cost savings over the 
life of the firm. So long as the one-year marginal tax increase did not 
exceed the present value of the innovation’s cost savings, employers would 
pursue the innovation notwithstanding the tax, making it efficient from an 
economic standpoint. 
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But this leads to the next difficulty: there could be a macroeconomic 
“crowding out” effect—increasing total taxes in the economy could result 
in less capital available for new investment by business.158 This raises the 
question of whether the crowding out effect itself is sufficient to undermine 
the benefits of the DST or whether the DST’s macroeconomic benefits 
could outweigh this cost. Although this is ultimately an empirical question, 
it is at least possible that the macroeconomic benefits of smoothing 
employment and budgets over time could well exceed the macroeconomic 
costs of reduced assets available for reinvestment. This is especially true in 
situations where there is plenty of private capital that is going unused due 
to the lack of growth in the economy as a whole. 
Further, there is some evidence indicating that so long as real wages 
adjust to clear the labor market over time, employment and productivity 
gains will settle toward the natural rate of employment, meaning any 
crowding out effect would only be temporary.159 To the extent growth is 
stagnant, temporary stimulus could well offset the cost of that stimulus 
through increased growth (assuming a positive multiplier). 
More importantly, however, there is nothing in the DST proposal that 
would prevent the enactment of other provisions intended to offset or 
ameliorate any inframarginal crowding out effect. Since the DST is aimed 
at the incidence of the corporate tax, it is theoretically unrelated to 
innovation stimulus. Thus, a tax subsidy for innovation could potentially be 
enacted in addition to the DST. 
For example, accelerated depreciation, increased expensing of capital 
goods, or research and development tax credits could all be adopted in 
addition to the DST. The tax benefits of these investment stimulus 
programs could offset or even exceed any increased taxes from the DST. 
These investment stimulus programs often reduce taxable income but not 
pretax profits, thereby reducing the impact of any increased tax rate under 
the DST. In fact, the value of tax benefits, such as accelerated depreciation 
and equipment expensing, is higher for corporations facing higher tax rates 
than for those facing lower ones.160 
Further, the combination of the DST and innovation stimulus, such as 
a research and development tax credit, could work together to overcome 
the second-best problem inherent in any tax-based incentive analysis: that 
the United States taxes net income. There are several benefits to using net 
income as a base for taxation, but the single biggest problem with using net 
 
158 See ROGER W. SPENCER & WILLIAM P. YOHE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE 
“CROWDING OUT” OF PRIVATE EXPENDITURES BY FISCAL POLICY ACTIONS (1970); Christina D. Romer 
& David H. Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure 
of Fiscal Shocks, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 763, 780–87 (2010). 
159 See Olivier Blanchard & Lawrence F. Katz, What We Know and Do Not Know About the 
Natural Rate of Unemployment, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 56–57 (1997). 
160 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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income is that it masks taxpayer-specific attributes.161 Under the DST, this 
means that it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between taxpayers 
who reduce employment as a means to shift the incidence of the corporate 
income tax and taxpayers who reduce employment due to innovation, since 
only the change in net income is observable. Thus, the DST, as with any 
rate-based mechanism, must apply to both types of taxpayers, even though 
the first-best solution would be to apply the DST only to the former. 
The research and development tax credit can serve as a second-best 
form of sorting mechanism for the above problem under two key 
assumptions. First, it must be assumed that taxpayers who reduce 
employment due to innovation have a lower cost of innovation than 
taxpayers who reduce employment to shift the corporate income tax, 
perhaps due to economies of scale, expertise, start-up costs of innovation, 
or some other reason. Under this assumption, only those taxpayers actually 
engaged in innovation would avail themselves of the research and 
development tax credit, since it would be costly for the other taxpayers to 
actually switch to innovation. Second, it must be assumed that it is costly 
for a taxpayer to disguise itself as an innovator due to substantiation costs, 
such as creating fraudulent receipts or work orders, or enforcement costs, 
such as “red flag” audit triggers.162 Under these relatively realistic 
assumptions, the DST combined with a properly designed research and 
development tax credit could be structured so as to benefit taxpayers 
primarily engaged in innovation. Taken together, the DST could not only 
serve to offset an inefficiency in the corporate income tax and result in a 
form of macroeconomic feedback, it could also make research and 
development subsidies more efficient and effective. 
B. Practical Challenges to Implementing the DST 
Even if the DST sounds promising in theory, how could it be 
implemented? Although several sticking points emerge, each has a solution 
that overcomes any fatal blows to the DST’s adoption. 
1. How to Calculate Employment.—The single biggest logistical 
issue with implementing the DST is calculating each firm’s increase or 
decrease in employment, which is required to calculate its ultimate tax rate. 
At first this may seem fatal to the real world applicability of the DST, since 
almost all labor data is calculated at the aggregate level.163 Upon closer 
inspection, however, it need not be. In fact, there is a proxy within the 
 
161 See Lawrence Zelenak, Essay, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2006). 
162 See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006). 
163 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment 
Situation—July 2011 (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_08
052011.pdf. 
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Internal Revenue Code that could be utilized to approximate firm-level 
employment data—the deduction for wages.164 Corporate income tax is 
imposed on a corporation’s profits, calculated as gross income less 
expenses, such as the cost of raw materials and the cost of wages;165 thus, as 
wages go down, taxable income goes up, all else being equal. 
Consequently, corporations already calculate and provide precisely the 
information on their own tax returns necessary to calculate the DST. Thus, 
the DST could use the percentage increase or decrease in the amount 
deducted from gross income for wages on a company’s yearly tax return. 
Although such an approach would solve the informational problem of 
implementing the DST, it potentially creates two other problems. First, the 
amount of wages paid by a corporate employer can change due to 
influences other than total employment, such as inflation (and deflation as 
well, although that has been less of an issue historically).166 Using nominal 
wage amounts would therefore give a tax rate reduction to corporations for 
increases in wages solely attributable to inflation rather than actual 
increases in employment. One potential fix for this problem would be to 
index the wage base for inflation,167 such that an employer would only have 
an increase or decrease in their tax rate to the extent of changes in the wage 
deduction from the prior year’s deduction after adjusting for inflation. 
This would not be novel in the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, the tax 
brackets for individuals (among other things) have been indexed for 
inflation since 1981,168 with many other features being indexed for inflation 
subsequently.169 Thus, since a mechanism for adjusting for inflation already 
exists within the tax law, implementing such an approach within the DST 
would simply require applying it to the salary deduction.170 
An alternative, however, would simply be to allow for reductions in 
the corporate tax rate due to increases in wages attributable to inflation. 
After all, employers are not required to give cost-of-living raises to 
employees—they do so typically as a matter of market competition for 
labor. Although it is unrelated to the purpose of the DST per se, providing 
an incentive to capital to allocate a portion of inflation-based returns to 
labor could be adopted as a separate policy goal of the DST mechanism. 
Regardless, the inflation issue is not one unique to the DST, and the 
 
164 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012). 
165 Id. §§ 61–62, 162. 
166 But see Jeff Strnad, Deflation and the Income Tax, 59 TAX L. REV. 243 (2006). 
167 See Yoram Margalioth, Student Paper, The Case for Tax Indexation of Debt, 15 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 205 (1998). 
168 See Richard J. Kovach, Technical and Policy Standards for Inflation Adjustments Under the 
Internal Revenue Code, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 605 (2008). 
169 See id. at 605–07. 
170 In fact, the IRS publishes official inflation adjusted brackets, deductions, exemptions, and 
credits for each year. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 617. 
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solutions to the inflation problem should not be outside the realm of 
possibility given that inflation adjustments are already part of the tax 
laws.171 
Another problem with using wages as a proxy for employment is that 
wages can remain flat or even go up while total employment goes down, 
simply by firing low-cost labor and using the savings to compensate highly 
paid management. This poses a significant challenge to the effectiveness of 
using wage deductions as a proxy for employment, as it could actually 
incentivize regressive allocations of wealth from labor to management, the 
opposite of the intended effect.172 The incentive for directors and 
management to enrich themselves at the expense of labor or capital is not 
unique to this proposal, however.173 For example, this issue has been the 
focus of recent corporate law revisions, such as the “say on pay” rules 
enacted as part of the recent Dodd–Frank law, which require shareholders 
to have an opportunity to vote on executive pay.174 To the extent these rules 
have any mitigating impact on management self-enrichment, which has 
been debated,175 this impact would also apply for purposes of the DST. 
Regardless of any corporate governance restrictions on management 
self-dealing, however, the tax law could structure limits on the ability of 
executives to manipulate the tax law for their own benefit. This is the other 
benefit of using wage deductions as the baseline for calculating the DST 
base—since the DST is also a creature of tax law, it can be made to work 
within the existing mechanisms of the tax law. 
For example, the Internal Revenue Code already restricts employers’ 
ability to deduct excessive executive salaries.176 The big exception to this 
limitation is salary tied to performance, such as stock options.177 Thus, one 
possibility to mitigate the problem of highly paid executives distorting the 
 
171 This is not to say it is an easy issue, but rather that it is not unique to the DST nor has it 
prevented other policy decisions from going forward. See Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic 
Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1430 (2003). 
172 See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code 
to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LABOR ECON. (COMPENSATION STRATEGY & 
DESIGN) S138 (2002). 
173 See, e.g., JOHN GILLESPIE & DAVID ZWEIG, MONEY FOR NOTHING: HOW THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE BOARDS IS RUINING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND COSTING US TRILLIONS (2010). 
174 See Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO 
Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 220–21 (2008). That the oversight is increased does not say 
whether it is a good idea generally, only that it mitigates the potential agency problem in the context of 
the DST. See Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1389–
90 (2010). 
175 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1810 (2011) (“The effectiveness of say-on-pay is highly contested.”). 
176 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012). This provision prevents corporations from taking a deduction for 
salaries in excess of $1 million per highly compensated executive with certain exceptions. 
177 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 626 n.49 (2011). 
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DST would be to take away the salary tied to performance exception and 
deny a deduction to corporations for excessive salaries paid to executives in 
the form of stock options or other equity instruments.178 Capping the 
deduction for management wages in this manner would prevent 
management from enriching itself at labor’s expense by denying the 
corporation the ability to maintain the same total deductible wages.179 
This broad proposal is not necessarily required to protect the DST, 
however. Alternatives include a requirement that amounts attributable to 
stock options or other equity compensation remain deductible but 
separately listed on the corporation’s tax return and excluded from the 
DST, or a requirement that all compensation of “highly compensated 
individual[s]” (a term already defined in the Internal Revenue Code180) be 
excluded from a corporation’s tax returns solely for purposes of the DST. 
This would allow the DST to more directly target the broader labor market 
rather than the narrow and highly compensated executive market. A similar 
approach could apply to any other type of compensation not included in the 
deduction for wages, such as reimbursements for employee travel,181 the 
cost of office supplies, and other employee amenities, like free coffee.182 
Similarly, using the income tax deduction for wages proves superior to 
using other wage base numbers, such as the payroll tax wage base. In 
general, for payroll tax purposes, wages are specifically defined to include 
all amounts paid to employees with only a few limited exceptions,183 
making it seem like the ideal proxy for the DST. One problem with this, 
however, is that wages do not include other nonemployee payments, such 
as payments to certain independent contractors.184 Thus, payments made to 
independent contractors, such as payroll systems or customer support, 
would be deductible for income tax purposes but not included in wages for 
payroll tax purposes. Assuming the decision to utilize an independent 
contractor is a business decision and not one intended to shift the incidence 
of the corporate tax onto labor, excluding these payments under the DST 
would be inappropriate since doing so would increase tax rates on pure 
business decisions. Accordingly, the income tax deduction for salary and 
salary-type payments would be a more appropriate baseline for the DST 
than the payroll tax wage base. 
 
178 See Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive 
Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 425–26 (2008). 
179 A policy similar to this was adopted with respect to companies participating in the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 
123 Stat. 115, 516–20. 
180 I.R.C. § 105(h)(5). 
181 Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1 (as amended in 1992). 
182 I.R.C. § 132. 
183 Id. § 3401. 
184 Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1 (1970). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1074 
Another concern with the DST is that using total salary deduction data 
would not ameliorate the incentive to shift jobs overseas, since salaries paid 
to offshore employees are deductible. This is not a problem unique to the 
DST proposal, however. For example, recent proposals have been made to 
defer a deduction for wages attributable to the activities of foreign business 
unless and until the income from such business is repatriated to the United 
States.185 Assuming these proposals were to become law, the incentive to 
employ workers offshore solely to minimize the DST would be reduced, 
although not completely offset. In other words, if deductions attributable to 
employing workers outside the United States are undesirable, they would 
be so regardless of whether the DST were in place.186 
Lastly, by building the DST adjustment into the tax code itself, it 
becomes easier to monitor and punish inflated or fraudulent employment 
numbers intended to game the DST. For instance, theoretically, the IRS 
could easily raise a red flag over a tax return where profits declined sharply 
but the deduction for wages remained unchanged.187 This increased chance 
of detection would make it riskier for corporations to artificially inflate 
wage deductions solely for purposes of manipulating the DST.188 Further, 
corporations already have an incentive to inflate the wage deduction under 
current law since every dollar of the wage deduction benefits the 
corporation approximately thirty-five cents (the tax savings from one less 
dollar of taxable profit). Moreover, whatever limits are in place currently to 
prevent artificial inflation of the wage deduction on tax returns could 
remain in place under the DST as well, further limiting corporations’ 
ability to artificially inflate wages solely to game the system. 
2. Loss Corporations or Corporations Without Income.—On its face, 
one weakness of the DST could be that precisely when it is needed the 
most, it may matter the least. In particular, the deeper a recession becomes, 
the more important unemployment becomes as a national policy matter. At 
the same time, corporate taxpayers are earning less and less profit. At some 
point, corporations will start losing money, at least on an annual basis. 
Since the DST is a rate mechanism, a corporation with no taxable income 
 
185 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, PART THREE: 
PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME AND INVESTMENT 13–24 (2009). 
186 It is interesting to note that it is not entirely clear whether such deductions are good or bad for 
the U.S. economy, with at least one study claiming there is a substantial positive domestic spillover 
potential. See Mihir A. Desai et al., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of US Multinationals, 
1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 181 (2009). 
187 See Raskolnikov, supra note 162, at 589. 
188 This also dovetails nicely with one of the intellectual predecessors of the DST, the self-
adjusting tax penalty. See id. at 599–605. The self-adjusting penalty described in Raskolnikov’s article 
would apply a higher penalty on tax fraud accomplished through recurring items such as the wage 
deduction rather than extraordinary items, which are easier to detect. In this way, the self-adjusting 
penalty and the DST would complement each other. 
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would be indifferent to the rate, and thus at first glance, the DST would be 
useless as a tool with respect to such a corporation. 
This problem, however, may not actually be so bad. First, tax liability 
is calculated on a year-by-year basis.189 What this means is that, except in 
dramatic crashes where profits go negative in less than one taxable year, 
the DST would still act as a marginal disincentive to layoffs as the profits 
of corporations begin to decline in the face of a recession. Accordingly, the 
DST could theoretically slow layoffs during the front years of a recession, 
at least as a method of shifting the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
Second, the DST would provide an incentive for corporations to rehire as 
the economy began to recover and corporate profits began to rise. 
Therefore, even if the DST did not serve its function as a deterrent to 
layoffs in the face of a recession, it could serve to subsidize hiring as the 
economy picks back up. 
Further, facing a higher tax rate under the DST could actually prove 
beneficial to loss companies (companies with tax losses), the opposite of 
the intuition behind tax rates. This is due to the “upside-down” nature of 
tax deductions—the higher the tax rate, the more tax deductions are 
worth.190 In a simplified example, providing one dollar of deduction to a 
taxpayer facing a 35% tax rate would save the taxpayer thirty-five cents, 
while the same dollar of deduction would be worth fifty-five cents to a 
taxpayer facing a 55% rate. For a company with tax losses, therefore, the 
higher the rate imposed, the more valuable those losses become. 
Perhaps just as important as the cash tax effect for loss companies are 
the financial statement benefits of a higher nominal statutory tax rate in the 
form of more valuable tax deductions. Assuming the DST applies only to 
publicly traded corporations, those corporations would be required to file 
financial statements, such as balance sheets, with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.191 In particular, one of the items required to be 
reported on the balance sheet under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) is an amount set aside to be paid for projected future tax 
liabilities.192 Very broadly speaking, accountants calculate this “tax reserve” 
by calculating taxable income and multiplying it by the statutory tax rate.193 
Thus, any raises to the statutory tax rate could increase the amount of tax 
liabilities reflected on a corporation’s balance sheet, impacting the 
 
189 I.R.C. § 441 (2012). 
190 See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 
343, 352 (1989). 
191 See 15 U.S.C § 78m (2012); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, 120 TAX 
NOTES 857, 872 (2008). 
192 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Accounting Standards Codification § 740-10 
[hereinafter ASC § 740-10]. For years prior to 2009, see Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 109 [hereinafter FAS 109]. 
193 ASC § 740-10; FAS 109 ¶ 19. 
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corporation’s total reported profits, even if the corporation had no taxable 
income in that particular year.194 Assuming shareholders and executives of 
corporations put at least some weight on reported earnings,195 this impact 
on earnings would provide corporations with a significant disincentive to 
face a higher statutory tax rate, even if the corporation owes no cash taxes 
in a particular year. Conversely, the value of tax losses on financial 
statements increases as the tax rate increases, meaning a loss corporation 
would welcome higher marginal tax rates because they would bolster the 
corporation’s assets on the balance sheet.196 Thus, loss corporations could 
actually benefit from any increased rates of the DST during periods of deep 
recessions. 
3. Do Rates Even Matter?—Another question that might arise with 
respect to a rate-based proposal, such as the DST, especially for large 
multinational corporations, would be whether rates even matter. 
Corporations have numerous ways to strip profits out of the tax base and 
thus avoid tax altogether. For example, recent reports claim that General 
Electric has paid virtually no U.S. taxes in recent years197 and Google has 
only paid 2.4% in taxes,198 notwithstanding the nominal 35% corporate tax 
rate. At first glance, these examples seem to suggest that the statutory rate 
is meaningless. If so, what good is a proposal that focuses on corporate tax 
rates? 
The most simplistic answer would be that, holding everything else 
constant, rates matter. Even assuming the existence of deferral and income-
shifting techniques that allow companies to minimize their taxes, an 
increased rate matters for the portion of income that remains subject to the 
income tax. Further, although not entirely clear, there is emerging empirical 
evidence that increased marginal tax rates can actually lead to increased 
effective tax rates, even with all of the income stripping and tax haven 
 
194 ASC § 740-10; FAS 109 ¶ 18. Further, the new rules require companies to calculate separately 
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Compliance: “This Return Might Be Correct But Probably Isn’t,” 29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 660 (2010) 
(“Tax departments no longer have ‘cookie jar’ reserves that represent a general overall reserve. The tax 
reserve of today represents an issue-by-issue, bottom-up, reserve analysis.”). 
195 See Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial 
Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J. 423 (2009). 
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Around Corporate Tax Changes, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 27, 53 (2011) (“Managers at firms with significant 
net deferred tax assets may lobby against statutory corporate tax rate cuts if they are primarily 
concerned with the short-term effect of such policy changes on reported after-tax income.”). 
197 David Kocieniewski, At G.E. on Tax Day, Billions of Reasons to Smile, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2011, at A1. 
198 Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 21, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/22/AR2010
102203253.html. 
108:1029 (2014) A Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-adjusting Corporate Tax Rate 
1077 
maneuvers available to modern multinational corporations.199 Lastly, there 
is evidence that marginal rates matter to corporations when determining 
which countries to invest in, even if they do not translate directly into total 
effective tax rates.200 
In addition, the key feature of the DST is that marginal tax rates can 
either go up or down. To the extent the DST would result in a reduction in 
marginal rates, such a result should create an incentive to reduce the 
shifting of income or other tax minimization or evasion strategies. Thus, 
the DST could potentially replace the incentive to engage in tax avoidance 
or evasion (through structural tax planning or otherwise) with the incentive 
to reduce marginal tax rates through increased hiring, in effect a double 
benefit for the United States.201 
IV. THE DST AND THE RHETORIC OF TAX POLICY 
Heated rhetoric over tax policy is nothing new.202 In fact, much has 
been written about how proponents of certain fiscal policy proposals have 
utilized rhetoric to achieve their goals.203 These include labeling the estate 
tax the “death tax” and labeling other taxes as “job killers,” among 
others.204 The rise of such rhetoric has generally been attributed to the 
Reagan tax cuts of 1981, although the critiques of such rhetoric have cut 
across administrations and party affiliation.205 
Two responses have generally been adopted to challenge the use of 
rhetorical devices in fiscal policy. First, the rhetoric has been challenged 
with empirical facts. Thus, one challenge to the rhetoric that all taxes kill 
jobs has been to look at the effect of the 1993 Clinton tax increases and 
point out that the tax increases led to economic growth both in terms of 
GDP and employment.206 Second, the rhetoric has been challenged as 
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disingenuous. Challenges to the use of the label “death tax” have been 
made by pointing out that “death tax” implies everyone must pay a tax on 
death when, in reality, the estate tax applies to a miniscule percentage of 
the population and only on the transfer of wealth to heirs, not on death 
itself.207 
Both of these challenges to tax policy rhetoric have existed for 
decades. Yet, for the most part, the rhetoric has not changed since the 
debates over the Reagan tax cuts; if anything, it seems to have gotten 
worse.208 Those advocating for increased progressivity in the tax law are no 
longer merely accused of hurting the economy,209 but of being socialist,210 
waging war against success,211 or worse. Those advocating for tax 
incentives to invest in factors of production are accused of giving away tax 
cuts to millionaires212 and acting indifferently or even hostile to the working 
and middle classes.213 
The DST takes a different approach to challenging the overheated 
rhetoric of the modern fiscal policy debate: affirmatively reclaiming the 
term “tax cut” to prevent it from being used as a rhetorical tool. By 
focusing on both short-term employment and long-term budget balance, the 
DST undermines the polar critiques of tax proposals that only focus on one 
or the other. Similarly, by looking at both demand-side stimulus, in the 
form of shifting tax burdens away from labor during periods of high 
unemployment, and supply-side stimulus, in the form of lower tax rates for 
new investments, the DST undermines the narrative that pro-employment 
policies are inherently anti-business, and vice versa. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the dynamic and self-adjusting nature of 
the DST could itself serve to undermine the political strength of the “tax 
hike” and “tax cut” rhetoric by reducing its salience. In other words, by 
being automatic it is possible for people to adjust their expectations to it, at 
least as compared to ad hoc measures. Rather than be accused of a tax hike 
or claim credit for a tax cut, the automatic nature of the DST makes it more 
like a “new normal”—just part of the legal landscape. No politician would 
have to risk proposing a tax hike or pander to offer a tax cut. 
This is not a new idea; other tax proposals have adopted a permanent 
and self-adjusting feature for precisely this reason.214 The difference is that 
the DST would be intended not only to exploit its automatic nature, but 
also to actually undermine the usefulness of the “tax cut” rhetoric as a 
political tool during periods of recession, opening space for a more 
reasoned and reasonable fiscal policy debate to occur. The need for a more 
sober debate in the area of fiscal policy has become increasingly pressing 
as a policy matter, especially as it becomes clear that even when 
policymakers agree on substance, the politics of the moment and the 
rhetoric of the debate may prevent any useful U.S. fiscal policy from being 
implemented.215 
Even worse, the rhetorical power of the “tax cut” label has been 
pointed to as a leading cause for people unintentionally supporting policies 
contrary to their own preferences.216 In fact, some claim that certain 
policymakers intentionally utilized the policy rationale underlying “tax 
cuts” to further a separate and unrelated agenda, which on its own might 
not fare as well.217 Using the promise of “tax cuts” for the general 
population as a “Trojan horse”218 to deliver tax benefits to small subgroups 
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is precisely the type of tactic that has prevented any meaningful progress in 
fiscal policy. To the extent the DST undermines the theoretical foundation 
of the argument by providing a policy tool that can be both a tax cut and 
tax increase at the same time, depending on one’s perspective, such tactics 
would no longer be possible. 
By reclaiming the label “tax cut” and replacing it with an actual policy 
proposal that incorporates both supply-side and demand-side policies, 
proposals like the DST could defuse some of the political and rhetorical 
power of the term. By attacking the foundation of the debate, rather than 
attempting to disprove the rhetoric with empirical data or theoretical 
critiques, proposals like the DST could destabilize the political power of 
the term. Ideally, removing this rhetorical hammer could open up space for 
policymakers to engage in substantive debates on fiscal policy, permitting 
new ideas targeted to the unique circumstances of the modern economy to 
rise to the surface. 
CONCLUSION 
The country finds itself in a dramatically different world than the one 
it faced during the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, or even 
those of 1932, 1961, or 1980. Technological and financial innovations are 
obvious; it is difficult to believe that anyone could have envisioned 
computers, let alone the Internet or smartphones, during those times. But 
macroeconomic trends have changed as much, if not more. The national 
debt as a percentage of GDP is approaching all-time highs, and the 
traditional monetary and fiscal policy tools used to combat unemployment 
and encourage economic growth appear to have been exhausted. But rather 
than fall prey to the analytical trap of rehashing the fiscal policy debates of 
these vastly different economic times, policymakers need to embrace novel 
solutions for the novel problems facing the modern economy. 
More specifically, the impact of macroeconomic conditions, such as 
high unemployment, on the incidence of the corporate tax should be taken 
into account in structuring a corporate tax robust enough to survive the next 
one hundred years. The DST provides one such approach: a targeted policy 
of tying the tax rate faced by public corporations to their employment 
decisions. The DST achieves this by increasing a corporation’s marginal 
income tax rate when it decreases payroll, while decreasing the 
corporation’s marginal income tax rate when it increases payroll. This 
mechanism takes into account the economic reality that employers can 
more easily shift the incidence of the corporate tax onto labor during 
periods of deep unemployment. The DST offsets this by imposing higher 
marginal tax rates on employers that shift the incidence of the corporate tax 
onto labor, while at the same time, rewarding employers through lower 
marginal tax rates for new investment in labor. In this manner, the DST can 
directly help subsidize employment, while also providing tax relief for 
108:1029 (2014) A Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-adjusting Corporate Tax Rate 
1081 
capital, thereby proving both pro-growth and pro-employment, all while 
being partly if not completely self-financing. 
As part of a larger project, however, the DST can hopefully provide a 
model for how fiscal policy can be used to respond to the modern 
challenges of the economy. If true, the DST, even if not adopted, could 
help lead to solutions uniquely tailored to the problems facing the modern 
economy—moving forward rather than continuing to refight the 
unproductive tax policy battles of older, much different, times. Through 
proposals such as the DST, real progress can be made toward solving the 
pressing fiscal and economic problems facing the country, and a new, 
modern corporate income tax can be built to survive the next one hundred 
years. 
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